Development at Home: A case study of development cooperation between the Swedish government and the Somali diaspora in Sweden by Paulsson, David
Lund University  STVM25 
Department of Political Science  Tutor: Roxanna Sjöstedt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development at Home 
A case study of development cooperation between the 
Swedish government and the Somali diaspora in Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
David Paulsson 
 
  
Abstract 
This paper departs from an interest which has grown exponentially since the 
beginning of the 2000s’ for cooperation between donor governments and 
diasporas in development initiatives directed at the diasporas’ country of origin. It 
notices a discrepancy between identified potential and observed practical results. 
In an attempt to understand this discrepancy, the thesis seeks to explore the 
seldom explicitly studied dynamics of interests between donor governments and 
conflict-generated diasporas in development cooperation. Thereby the study seeks 
to contribute to an understanding of the conditions underpinning diaspora 
engagement in development work. 
 To achieve this end, a case study on the development cooperation between 
Swedish development agencies and the Somali diaspora in Sweden is conducted. 
Interviews are carried out with members of the Somali diaspora and Swedish 
development agencies, all of whom have experience of joint development 
initiatives.  
It is argued that the dynamics of interest are influenced by the diasporas 
special relationship with both the home and host country, and that the dynamics 
are present in the political, economic, cultural and social sphere. Finally, a set of 
theoretical concepts that are central to understanding the dynamics of interests in 
this form of development cooperation are developed. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2002, a USAID-report was published with the title “Foreign Aid in the National 
Interest”. The report contained an element of surprise, perhaps best captured in a 
table on the 27
th
 page. The topic of the table was “Estimated U.S. international 
assistance to developing countries, 2000” (USAID 2002 p. 27). What was 
arguably most unexpected was not the volumes but rather the title of a row, 
namely “Individual remittances” (ibid. p. 27). The content of the table might seem 
technical but the content of the matter was that for the first time had an OECD-
donor incorporated migrant remittances in its international assistance statistics 
(Brinkerhoff 2010 p. 38). Prior to this publication and even more exponentially 
since
1
, the interest in both remittances and wider diaspora contributions to 
development has gained considerable attention. Several donor governments have 
sought ways to engage the diaspora in their national development policies (see De 
Haas 2006, section 2.3 in this paper).  
The rapid development of both the interest in diasporas and the link between 
diasporas and development merits attention. Departing from recent interest and 
research, both in academia and the policy sphere, this paper will seek an 
understanding of the conditions for cooperation between donor governments and 
diasporas in development assistance directed at the diasporas’ country of origin. 
Both in academia and policy, potential benefits of including and engaging the 
diaspora in development assistance have been stipulated quite frequently. This 
potential have also left marks in several government policies, such as 
development strategies. However, the potential have not been matched by 
practical results.
2
 This gap between potential and practice intuitively highlights 
the need for research about the conditions for such cooperation to take place.  
One frequently underlying factor in research about this form of cooperation is 
the interaction of interests between diasporas and donor governments. Yet, this 
factor is seldom explicitly addressed. Moreover, the relationship between conflict-
generated diasporas and governments are particularly interesting considering both 
the presumed development needs of countries that generate diasporas, and 
because these relationships could be especially problematic and contain a complex 
set of interests given the background of the diaspora. Indeed, the potential 
complexity of interests begs attention. Since the prospects of donor and diaspora 
cooperation are appealing, rushed policies can easily come at the expense of 
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 No causal suggestion is intended by this statement. 
2
 A background to the stipulated potential as well as the lack of practical results can be found in the chapter on 
previous research (see section 2.2 and 2.3). 
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ignoring the perhaps problematic complexity of interests. This would however 
lead to a flawed conception of this form of cooperation.  
1.1 Research question 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the interactions of interests between 
donor governments and conflict-generated diasporas in development cooperation 
in an attempt to seek understanding of the conditions underpinning diaspora 
engagement in development work. Against this background the research question 
for this paper can be formulated: 
  
 How can the dynamics of interests in development cooperation among 
Swedish governmental agencies and the Somali diaspora in Sweden be 
understood? 
 
In order to answer the research question above, the similar question how the 
phrase “the dynamics of interest” can be understood begs an answer. Dynamics of 
interest refers to the interests of the diaspora and the government agencies and 
how these relate to each other. In other words, what common as well as 
contentious interests there are. The paper will pay particular attention to the 
contentious interests since these constitute the most problematic area and are 
likely to highlight the complexity involved. It phrase also refers to the influence 
that interests can have on one another, and how interests are influenced by the 
particular context of development cooperation between diaspora and government. 
Therefore, in order to answer the research question above, this paper will, apart 
from identifying common and contentious interests and the factors that influence 
these, develop a set of concepts that are central to understanding how interests are 
constituted and influenced in development cooperation.  
The main purpose of this paper is theory-development since no theoretical 
model for the dynamics of interest in this form of development cooperation has 
been developed. As mentioned above, the issue have been touched upon by 
various studies (see 2.3) but no paper has explicitly developed a model of the kind 
proposed here. Developing the proposed set of theoretical concepts should yield 
relevant insights into the interests in development cooperation. Thus previously 
unobserved, or at least untheorized, but important factors can be observed. 
Therefore, the paper seeks to fill a gap in previous research and the cumulative 
knowledge on the topic. The paper departs from and can contribute to the research 
fields of diaspora politics and studies on migration and development. Indeed, this 
paper will depart from diaspora politics in order to gain insight as to how the 
development cooperation is influenced by the special perspective and properties 
of diasporas.  
The paper can furthermore be of importance to policy-makers since the form 
of cooperation discussed here is frequently part of national and international 
development strategies (cf De Haas 2006, Utrikesdepartementet 2013 p. 4). The 
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topic is furthermore filling an empirical gap since few studies have examined 
diaspora engagement in a Scandinavian or Swedish context. 
1.1.1 Definitions  and delimitations  
The concept ”diaspora” will be the subject of a lengthier discussion in later 
chapters (see 2.1, 3.1) and will therefore not be elaborated here. Some definition 
and disclaimers are needed however. “Development cooperation” will refer to any 
form of development policy, strategy, program, project or other development 
work directed at the home country, Somalia in this case, where both diaspora, the 
Somali diaspora in Sweden in this case, and government agencies, Swedish 
government agencies in this case, are involved. Note that development 
cooperation therefore exclusively will refer to cooperation between donor 
government agencies and the diaspora and not cooperation between other civil 
society actors and governments or inter-governmental cooperation, unless it is 
explicitly stated.  
Moreover, the phrase “contentious interests” mentioned above in relation to 
the research question needs some clarification. The phrase does not solely refer to 
interests were the interests of the government and the diaspora are directly 
conflicting. Rather, it refers to all interests that have generated dissatisfaction or 
disappointment. To just study common and conflicting interests would limit the 
study to interests that have a counterpart among other actors. In other words, 
interests that one actor possesses but other actors are indifferent to would not be 
captured. Therefore, in order to gain a fuller understanding of the dynamics of 
interest, even interests that are not reciprocal are included in the phrase 
contentious interests. 
It should also be noted that this paper does not employ semantic rigidity 
regarding the “home” and “host” country. To denote the country to which the 
diaspora has migrated, the terms “receiving state” and “host country” will be used 
interchangeably. To denote the country from which the diaspora has migrated the 
terms “home country” or “sending state” will be used interchangeably. The term 
“homeland” will be used to denote the home country as well but will refer to the 
diasporas’ subjective imagery or understanding of the home country.  
Some limitations are furthermore suitable to state at this point. This paper will 
treat development cooperation involving conflict-generated diasporas (see 3.1). 
The ambition is to gain theoretical insights relevant for theory on this particular 
set of cases, and there is no ambition to generalize the findings beyond this sub 
set.
3
 Furthermore, despite the fact that this paper studies the conditions for 
development cooperation, causality will not be studied. Therefore, conclusions 
about when, how or even if development cooperation can contribute to the 
development of the home country is beyond the scope of this paper. Likewise, 
conclusions regarding how the dynamics of interest affects the development 
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cooperation in contrast to other factors, such as structural constraints, are not 
possible. Conclusions can solely be drawn about the dynamics of interest and not 
the causal effect on or of development cooperation. This does not however make 
the study irrelevant since the aforementioned purpose of investigating the often 
visible but seldom studied dynamics of interest in order to understand conditions 
for cooperation is a highly relevant exercise in itself. 
  5 
2 Previous research 
This chapter will briefly review the previous research regarding the topic in this 
paper. The purpose of this chapter is first and foremost to situate this thesis within 
the context of previous academic work and to explicate the gap this paper seeks to 
fill. The concept of diaspora will be reviewed first. Subsequently, a longer 
discussion about the migration-development nexus will be presented that will 
successively narrow down to the field that is most interesting for the topic at hand, 
namely development cooperation. 
2.1 Diaspora group concept  
Before proceeding to a review of literature on diasporas and development some 
discussion of the concept diaspora is advantageous. Two broad dimensions within 
the previous research will be made visible. First, the basic but complex discussion 
about what the concept diaspora refers to will be treated. Second, the 
philosophical positivist-constructivist underpinnings of various definitions and 
conceptions of “diaspora” will be discussed. 
“Diaspora” as a concept has, along with exponentially growing research 
interest during the last decades, accumulated several interpretations, meanings and 
uses (Dufoix 2008 pp. 31-33; Brubaker 2005). This dispersion of the word, or as 
Brubaker put it “the ‘diaspora’ diaspora” (Brubaker 2005) of course highlights the 
risk of conceptual stretching where the extension of a concept becomes so big that 
the intension suffers. Brubaker (2005 pp. 5-7) still identifies some commonalities 
in descriptive definitions. Diasporas are commonly conceptually constituted by 
dispersion in space, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance.  
Dufoix (2008 pp. 21-25) presents a helpful three-way meta-categorisation of 
definitions: open, categorical and oxymoronic. Open definitions do not 
discriminate and no limitation to the number of observations are provided 
beforehand. A recent could be what Esman (2009 p. 14) terms “the modern usage 
of the term that covers ‘any transnational migrant community that maintains 
limitations and opportunities in its country of settlement’ […]”. Another 
recognised definition is one by Sheffer which refers to ethno-national diasporas. 
Categorical definitions refer do those that do limit the number of observed cases 
according to a criteria and consequently distinguish between “true” and “false” 
diasporas. It has for instance been argued that a “true diaspora” should contain a 
large enough number of migrants relative to the population residing in the sending 
state (Dufoix 2008 p. 22). Another well-known example is the criteria-based 
definition offered by Cohen (2001 p. 26) where a set of nine “common features of 
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a diasporations” is presented, and the more characteristics that are fulfilled, the 
more true or ideal-typical the diaspora is. Oxymoronic definitions refer to 
postmodern approaches that seek to capture the hybrid identity of diasporas. 
Therefore, essential features are not only unhelpful but in ways contrary to 
diasporic identity since difference, as opposed to similarities, is at the core of the 
concept diaspora (Dufoix p. 24) 
Brubaker (2005 p. 12) responds to the dispersion by suggesting that 
“diaspora” should stop being treated like a substantial, descriptive category but 
rather as “idiom, stance and claim”, thus being a “category of practice” with 
normative functions. Dufoix (2008 p. 62-66, 107) meanwhile presents an ideal-
typical framework for “structuring the experience abroad”, rather than answering 
the question “what is a diaspora?”.  
As is apparent from the preceding discussion, several epistemological 
positions are visible when approaching the concept diaspora. The categorical 
definitions in many ways adopt a positivist perspective in the strive to define 
diasporas according to, often quantitative, factual criteria. Meanwhile, there is a 
constructivist tradition, mainly among the oxymoronic definitions. Here, the 
formation and constitution of identity are central themes.  
Furthermore, the adherence to both positivist and constructivist perspectives 
can be observed within single definitions. One example is Sheffer who both 
emphasises the physical and virtual boundaries that diasporas relate to (Sheffer 
2003 p.11-12). The last perspective could largely be observed in a critical realist 
perspective where both the “real” and the constructed are acknowledged.   
2.2 Migration-development nexus 
Having briefly introduced the concept of diaspora, it is relevant to turn to the link 
between migration and development. The academic and policy-oriented interest in 
this nexus has experienced an increase during the last twenty years and most 
exponentially since the turn of the century (Brinkerhoff 2010 p. 38; De Haas 2006 
p. 1; Faist & Fauser 2011 pp. 2-3). The potential links between migration and 
development are plenty, both looking at how local development affects migration, 
how migration affects local development, what the development implications are 
of different kinds of migration, what is the development implications of return 
migration and what inclines migrants to contribute to development in the country 
of origin (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002 pp. 18-24).  
The field will be narrowed down but a brief general history of the link is 
suitable. Using broad strokes, Faist & Fauser (2011 pp. 4-8) categorises the 
history of this nexus into three phases. During the 1950s’ and 60s’ migration 
intended to fill labour gaps in the North were believed to contribute to 
development through financial remittances and return migration. This would 
involve a natural knowledge transfer from the North to the South. The optimism 
turned pessimism during the 70s’ and 80s’ when the perceived causal relationship 
reversed and migration came to be seen as the product and not a solution of 
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underdevelopment. The linkage was placed within the context of the dependency 
structures where reversed transfer of knowledge, or brain drain, accentuated rather 
than alleviated underdevelopment. The last turn began in the 1990s’ bringing 
about the regained optimism regarding the connection between migration and 
development that is now visible among global and national development actors, 
such as the World Bank and OECD-donors (Faist 2008 p. 26).  
What distinguishes the new phase from previous ones is the agency ascribed 
to migrants (Faist 2008 p 26; Faist & Fauser 2011 p. 7-8). Previous research has 
been more inclined to top-down structural conceptions of migration and 
development. Exchanges were conceived to be constituted solely by resources and 
the main unit of analysis was the nation-state, sending and receiving. Only during 
the 1990s’ was the process of migration nuanced to account for migrants as agents 
(Faist & Fauser 2011 p. 15). According to Faist & Fauser (2011 pp. 8-12) the new 
conception of the research topic is simultaneously underpinned by and in need of 
a transnational perspective, that provides space for the “new” transnational and 
“diasporic actors”. This is necessary in order to arrive at a more thorough 
understanding of transnational transfers and networks. Glick Schiller (2011 p. 32) 
similarly argues that “methodological nationalism” should be replaced by a 
“global power perspective” in migration studies that would observe 
transnationalism and introduce new units of analysis.  
Previous critique of the development-potential of migration, informed by 
dependency-theory and brain drain has not vanished however. The view often 
associated with the latest phase is that knowledge networks, such as expatriates, 
can create a brain gain in the sending country through knowledge transfer (cf 
Meyer 2001). However, brain drain is still a commonly identified issue in the 
health sector in Sub-saharan Africa (cf. Connell et al. 2007). However, even in 
this field, receiving countries are encouraged to work together with the diaspora to 
mitigate the crisis (ibid. p. 1888).   
Criticism has however also been aimed at the possibility of an overly actor-
centric perspective and that the shift to more optimism about the migration-
development nexus is likely a result of a paradigmatic shift to neo-liberal 
perspectives on development. Therefore, while not reducing the issue to structures 
and the macro-level, this level must also be recognised, along with the recognition 
that there is no universal link between migration and development, independent of 
context (cf De Haas 2010).  
2.2.1 Remittances and beyond 
It should be noted that remittances has been a factor of particular importance in 
the rediscovery of the migration-development linkage. It has been stated that 
“[v]irtually all published work on migration and development has touched upon 
remittances […]” (Skeldon 2008 p. 7). Brinkerhoff (2011 p. 38) points out that 
remittances gained attention quite precipitously and therefore caught the eye of 
many policymakers.  
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It should be noted that many studies on remittances still arguably adhere to 
structural analysis, often using “methodological nationalism”. Examples include 
quantitative analysis of the impact of remittances on growth in different 
developing countries (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009), the effects of remittances 
on poverty-mitigation in Sub-saharan Africa (Gupta et al. 2009) and how 
remittances compare to other financial flows, such as Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to developing countries (Gammeltoft 2002; Bodomo 2013).  
Along with the structural level, the new transnational perspective is argued to 
highlight the ”meso-level phenomena of  transnational actors and associated 
transfers beyond the limited but dominating focus on ﬁnancial remittances” (Faist 
et al. 2011 p. 2). Nyberg-Sørensen et al (2002 p. 15) furthermore state that 
research about the nexus traditionally have been focused around the economics of 
migration, thereby reducing migration to an economic act and migrants to 
labourers, while ignoring the political, social and cultural dimensions. In 
correspondence with the abovementioned research development there is an 
interest, not least among policy makers in diaspora activity “beyond remittances” 
(De Haas 2006 p. 3, 60-64).  
“Beyond remittances” could carry two different meanings. On the one hand, 
remittances could be is defined conservatively as private monetary transfers to the 
country of origin. Activities beyond remittances may then involve several 
economic, political and social transfers, such as technology transfer, investment, 
tourism and political contributions as well as other transfers of knowledge, 
attitudes and culture that could be very intangible and where data is scarce (cf. 
Newland & Patrick 2004). On the other hand, remittances could refer to all 
resources, monetary or social. Then, “beyond remittances” refers to studies where 
remittances are viewed within the social processes that provide them with 
meaning. Such studies contextualise resources and seek to achieve a less resource-
reductionist conception of diasporas and development (cf. Iskander 2008).  
2.3 Diaspora cooperation with host governments in 
development 
Following the variety of factors identified above; the agency ascribed to 
transnational diasporic actors, a widened and deepened conception of diasporas 
involvement in sending state development and interest among both academics and 
policy-makers; much interest has been aimed at involving diasporas in the 
development work of donors.  
Since the middle of the 2000s’ several articles have been published on 
diaspora engagement in development projects by national development agencies 
as well as international institutions. The field is however fairly new. It should be 
noted that several relevant and sometimes well-cited papers have been policy 
reports produced by or for different organisations and institutes. Notable examples 
include De Haas (2006) for Oxfam Novib, Ionescu (2006) for IOM (International 
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Organisation for Migration) and Kleist & Vammen (2012) for DIIS (Danish 
Institute for International Studies). These reports will therefore not provide the 
core of this section or the construction of the theoretical framework in the 
subsequent chapter. 
Some academic studies have acknowledged the potential of engaging 
diasporas in development assistance, but display a degree of scepticism about the 
practical prospects. Orozco (2008) provides a review of cooperative projects 
between governments and diasporas. It is stressed that diasporas are important to 
involve in development cooperation (Orozco 2008 p. 210). However, some 
challenges are identified, such as limited knowledge of diasporas among 
development actors, limited development expertise among diasporas, policy 
problems created by the link to migration policy and limited communication from 
donors to diasporas (ibid. p. 228).   
 Brinkerhoff (2011) provides an enlightening although somewhat sceptical 
assessment of the narrative and prospects of diaspora instrumentalisation for 
development purposes. The scepticism is not inherently aimed at diaspora 
partnerships which holds potential, but rather directed at the overly enthusiastic 
narrative about their potential, based on several procedural and substantial 
problems that should be present in the partnership. Demands of bureaucratic 
adaptation could be resisted by diaspora organisations and even if they adapt, the 
instrumentalisation is likely to diminish their comparative advantage that 
motivated the partnership (Brinkerhoff 2011 p. 43). In conclusion, strong 
organisational identity among the diaspora organisations as well as mutuality in 
the cooperation to ensure that diasporas do not become an extension of the donor 
agency is suggested as prerequisites for successful development initiatives (ibid. 
pp. 45-46). Consequently development assistance with some degree of 
instrumentalisation of diaspora organisations is optimal, but beyond a point, 
further instrumentalisation will result in diminishing returns (ibid. p. 45).  
Vammen & Brønden (2012) provides an overall sceptical assessment of the 
implications of what is coined “migration-development buzz” and entailing a 
simplistic optimism regarding the link between the two. In a study of two 
countries, it is found that government contact with diaspora groups led to 
disappointments and both countries are scaling down diaspora engagement 
activities (Vammen & Brønden 2012 pp. 32-34, 37). The identified problems 
where defining who the diaspora is in the face of multiple actors and associations, 
that the diaspora may oppose the home country government or support regional or 
local development rather than national development and, lastly, uncertain capacity 
in project execution (ibid. p. 33). 
Other studies have argued that attempts to engage the diaspora in development 
assistance approach to issue erroneously to begin with. Horst (2013) highlights the 
politics of diasporas from the Horn of Africa. The main obstacles to engaging 
diasporas in development work are a perceived lack of values that are expected by 
donor governments, namely neutrality or non-discriminatory approaches, 
impartiality or apolitical engagement, and finally unity or lack of fragmentation 
within the diaspora (Horst 2013 pp. 232-235). Here it is argued that refugee 
diasporas have a political nature which is denied when Western development 
  10 
apply their ideals to the diaspora (ibid. p. 235). It is argued that diaspora 
engagement should be reconceptualised as civic participation rather than aid-work 
(ibid. pp. 239-242). 
The preceding review of existing literature prescribes an assessment of at least 
three issues before the theoretical framework can be formalised. First, the thesis’ 
position in relation to recent literature on the migration-development nexus and 
studies regarding diaspora engagement in development should be considered. 
Second, a definition of diaspora needs to be presented along with, lastly, a brief 
discussion about the epistemological underpinnings and consequences of the 
adapted definition. Once these issues have been addressed, and the interest of 
diaspora groups have been elaborated, it will be argued that this paper fills a gap 
in the existing literature reviewed above on diaspora cooperation with host 
governments. 
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3 Theory 
The preceding review of previous research provides a foundation to theorise 
possible contentions of interests between diaspora groups and development 
agencies. First, it should be stated that this study on the one hand can be 
considered a part of the third wave of migration-development academia in several 
ways. First, rather than investigating structural conditions, mechanisms or effects, 
this study places agency at the core of analysis by highlighting the motives, 
interests and actions of actors involved in the process. Second, it particularity 
emphasises the role played by diasporic actors. Third, in association with the 
articulation of agency, it seeks to capture transfers and actions at all levels, such 
as transfers “beyond remittances”. 
On the other hand, the research question in this paper works partly according 
to the “methodological nationalist” perspective in the sense that “Swedish 
governmental agencies” and “the Somali diaspora in Sweden” are defined 
according to nationalist criteria. This is not so much a flaw however, but merely 
an ascertainment. The paper still highlights a topic that is current and relevant 
both within and outside academia. Furthermore, governmental development 
assistance is still mainly nationally defined and the national perspective is 
therefore a logical approach. It is reasoned that the national perspective is not 
irreplaceable considering the variety of alternative approaches to the subject, but 
neither is it insignificant. 
3.1 Definition 
This study will employ a definition of diaspora by Sheffer (2003 pp. 9-10). It is a 
lengthy definition but the important points are that “ethno-national diasporas” are 
formations that permanently reside in a country as a result of migration from a 
homeland. They organise to keep a common identity in relation to the homeland 
and a nation. They are active in the cultural, social, economic and political spheres 
(Sheffer 2003 pp. 9-10).
4
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 The complete original definition is ”an ethno-national diaspora is a social-political formation, created as a 
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permanently in host countries, but to maintain a common identity, diasporans identify as such, showing 
solidarity with their group and their entire nation, and they organize and are active in the cultural, social, 
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The reasons for using the preface “ethno-national” are two-fold. First, it serves 
to distinguish diasporas with a territorially localisable nation from other trans-
state groups lacking such a territorial homeland (ibid. pp. 10-11). Second, it 
stresses that the intended groups “regard themselves as being participants in 
nations that have common ethnic and national traits, identities and affinities” 
(ibid. p. 11). 
The definition is suitable for a number of reasons. First, despite the wide 
variety of usages of the term diaspora, the definition indeed refers to what 
familiarly is called a diaspora in both academic and lay language. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the definition corresponds to the three commonalities in 
diaspora-definitions identified by Brubaker presented in the previous chapter. 
Second, despite a variety of attributes, the definition is still coherent and lacks 
internal contradictions. Third, it also differentiates diasporas from other groups 
that share certain characteristics. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it is 
theoretically useful since it incorporates descriptive features, actions and 
processes in a variety of areas. Therefore, the definition itself points out several 
interesting arenas and processes relevant for study. The aforementioned 
conceptual attributes familiarity, coherence, differentiation and theoretical utility 
have all been argued to be important criteria in concept-formation (Gerring 1999 
pp. 368-370, 373-379, 381-382). 
The definition is furthermore labelled an open definition by Dufoix (2009 p. 
21) according to the categorisation presented in the previous chapter. The 
definition could be considered categorical since it excludes transnational 
communities that lack a physical homeland. These communities would be 
included when using a postmodern or oxymoronic definition (Dufoix 2008 p. 25). 
However, when studying diasporas and development, excluding the physical 
homeland from the definition would be nonsensical since development projects 
presupposes a physical territory. This is not to argue that a transnational 
perspective is unwarranted, the opposite point has been made; It is not however a 
suitable definition for the phenomena in this paper.  
The last point is also related to the study on conflict-generated diasporas in 
this paper. There has to have been a territorial conflict that generated the diaspora. 
Not necessarily a conflict predominantly about territory, but one that is localisable 
in a territory. The definition above will furthermore be amended by adding that 
the diaspora migrated from a homeland engaged in or affected by conflict.  
A more categorical definition would be problematic. For instance, the criterion 
that a certain ratio between population in the diaspora and the entire nation must 
be present, in unwanted. The criterion is reductionist regarding diaspora relations 
since it solely concerns their ties to the homeland. The definition by Sheffer 
incorporates permanent residence and organisation in the receiving state as key 
concerns, which is more suitable to this paper. Another advantage is the focus on 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
economic, and political spheres. Among their various activities, members of such diasporas establish trans-state 
networks that reflect complex relationships among the diasporas, their host countries, their homelands, and 
international actors.”   
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agency rather that structural features that is provided by the adapted definition. In 
this regard, the incorporation of activity and the spheres of these activities are 
particularly advantageous.   
The thesis will work according to a critical realist epistemological standpoint. 
The underpinnings of this perspective were briefly mentioned in the previous 
chapter and the methodological implications of this perspective will be discussed 
more in-depth in the next chapter (see 4.2.1). In essence, critical realism can be 
summarised as providing “an alternative to both hopes of law-finding science of 
society modelled on natural science methodology and the anti-naturalist of 
interpretivist reductions of social science to the interpretation of meaning” (Sayer 
2000 pp. 2-3). One key feature of critical realism is the study of “real but 
unobservable objects” (Jackson 2010 pp. 77). These objects can be studied by 
positing the “existence of some process, entity, or property that accounts for the 
observational data” (ibid. p. 83).   
Indeed, this standpoint aligns well with the definition. The definition posits 
that there are real descriptive features of diasporas, such as migration, residence, 
contacts as well as real essential features of diasporas. Meanwhile, this is not 
accomplished at the expense of reducing the diaspora to a matter of true or false. 
The definition instead incorporates constructivist elements, such as nation, 
identity, solidarity and activity.  
3.2 Spheres of interest 
Departing from the definition above, some notes and elaborations about diaspora 
group interests will be presented. Sheffer (2003 p. 79) asserts that a common 
identity is necessary but not sufficient for diaspora establishment. These identities 
must furthermore, as a result of rational and emotional factors, result in 
organisation and the establishment of diaspora organisations. Sheffer (2003 p. 26) 
suggests two reasons for organising; (1) To gain a better position in the receiving 
state as well as (2) supporting developments in the homeland. The relationship 
between the diaspora and the receiving state is very important for the formation of 
diaspora organisation since they are a result of several decisions by the migrant on 
how to respond to the new circumstances. An assessment of these conditions is a 
precondition for the establishment of a diaspora (Sheffer 2003 p. 130).  
The decisional aspect is an important part of the focus on agency as opposed 
to just structures (ibid. p. 112). There are several strategies that can be adopted by 
migrants and diasporas once they decide to, at least to a degree, permanently settle 
in the receiving state. Communalist or corporatist strategies “aims to achieve a 
reasonable degree of “absorption” of diasporas into the host society, but not full 
integration, which might lead to assimilation – all the while maintaining 
continuous and unwavering relations with the homeland” (ibid. p. 164). Diaspora 
organisations preserve identity while providing a platform for cohesive promotion 
of interests. It is the most common strategy among state-linked (as opposed to 
state-less) diasporas, and the main motivation could be summarised as attempting 
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to be “home abroad” (ibid. p. 164). Sheffer also states that the majority of state-
less diasporas also pursue a communalist strategy (ibid. p. 157). However, state-
less diasporas that support separatist movement can cause problems for sending 
and receiving state, sometimes through violent means (ibid. p. 157-160).   
The interests of the diasporas opting not for radical aggressive and violent  
tactics will then be formulated through activities in the political, economic, 
cultural and social sphere (ibid. pp. 172-179). Diasporas could work as interest-
groups in the political sphere, fund-raisers and investors in the economic sphere, 
promoters of culture and social ideas in the cultural and societal sphere (ibid. pp. 
172-175). These interests can furthermore be present in their relationship with the 
sending state as well as the receiving state and other diaspora communities. 
Therefore, it is important to not reduce diaspora interests to interests in the 
sending state when one of their main functions is to allow identity continuity in 
the receiving state. Activities in these spheres are necessary to achieve both a 
secure existence and integrity in the receiving state while maintaining and 
continuing the relationship and exchange with their homeland (ibid. p. 172).  
What is visibly lacking from previous research is the recognition of the 
complexity of diaspora interest and activity in different spheres. The studies that 
attempted to investigate donor-diaspora cooperation have on the one hand focused 
on single issues such as the problem of neglecting or approaching political issues 
in the cooperation or problems associated with instrumentalisation. On the other 
hand, some studies have identified several problems but the problems have not 
been systematically analysed and incorporated within a coherent theoretical 
framework. The recognition that the interests that underpin these issues are a part 
of a wider and more complex web of interests is to a large degree absent. 
Similarly, the dynamics of interests among governmental and diaspora actors are 
not explicitly addressed despite being an potentially underlying issue in several of 
the identified problems. 
In order to capture this complexity, the subsequent theoretical discussion will 
be structured according to the spheres identified by Sheffer. First, when departing 
from the different spheres, interests can be separated in different spheres instead 
of being treated as simply general or overarching. Second, it also allows for 
comprehensive analysis since a single sphere or dimension is not predetermined to 
be of singular importance. Hence, a more complex set of interests can emerge.  
The following sections will deliberate the dynamics of interests within each 
sphere, the political, economic, societal and cultural sphere, by considering both 
theoretical insights in diaspora studies as discussed above, as well as previous 
research regarding diaspora engagement in development. Within each sphere an 
argument will be formulated which collectively will constitute the spine of the 
analysis. The starting point for each section is the main function the diaspora 
organisation has in each sphere. Departing from this function, the implications for 
development cooperation will be discussed. 
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3.2.1 Political sphere  
Sheffer (2003 p. 172) points out that diasporas can basically function similarly to 
other interest-groups in the political sphere, by usage of lobbying and promotional 
and advocacy activity. In the context of diaspora engagement, the political activity 
can both be aimed at the homeland state as well the receiving state.  
Diasporas can have political interests in the homeland, which should be 
especially true for conflict-generated diasporas.  This is the point raised by Horst 
(2013) when discussing cooperation between donors and conflict-generated 
diasporas. The diaspora organisation may seek to advance political interests 
whereas development agencies seek impartiality in development projects. The 
principle of impartiality becomes highly problematic since diasporas from post-
conflict societies are often politically engaged. Since the sending country per 
definition is contested through conflict, questions about who are a part of the 
diaspora and what their purpose is are inherently political (ibid. pp. 236-237, 239).  
This conclusion could indeed be supported by documented political 
aspirations of conflict-generated diasporas to influence the receiving states’ 
foreign policy. Studies have found diasporas to seek political influence on foreign 
policy, such as the Albanian diaspora in the UK and the US (Koinova 2013) and 
the Cuban and Iraqi diaspora in the US (Vanderbush 2009). Hence, since the 
homeland is contested, any action towards it involves a political consideration. 
Therefore, conflict-generated diasporas are expected to seek political influence. 
Moreover, as Sheffer (2003 p. 175) points out, political lobbying is a defence 
function to secure political rights in the host country. Partnerships with the host 
government in general should secure the diaspora members rights. Therefore, a 
political interest in inclusion can inform the diaspora and potentially influence the 
development cooperation. This point is echoed in a study by Ross (2013 pp. 298-
299) where diaspora group interests in foreign policy are influence by the 
minority status of the group. Influence in foreign policy could be perceived as an 
instrument to achieve societal inclusion and internal mobilisation. However, the 
advancement of interests in the homeland might hinder their interest in integration 
if the interests stand in opposition to the host government. Therefore, the interests 
in the homeland could also be toned down (ibid. pp. 301-302).  
In other word, a trade-off between interests in the home and host country 
might be present. Therefore, the political sphere should be important in 
development cooperation but it is difficult to determine if the interests are 
contentions or not. Based on the previous discussion, a tentative argument will be 
put forward below.  
 
Argument 1: Contending interests could arise in the political sphere between 
diasporas and government agencies as diasporas seek political influence. 
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3.2.2 Economic sphere 
Considering the attention directed at the development potential of remittances, the 
economic sphere should be one of considerable mutual interest between the 
diaspora and donor governments. As Sheffer (2003 p. 172-173) points out, one 
function of diasporas is to organise fund-raising and investment organisations. 
From a theoretical standpoint, such endeavours are correspondent to the neo-
liberal paradigm in development studies. Sheffer (2003 p. 173) proceeds to stress 
that diasporas often seek to work as facilitators of economic ties between sending 
and receiving state. Furthermore, Orozco (2008 pp. 219-225) identified positive 
examples of both the intergovernmental organisation The Inter-American 
Development Bank and the donor agency and USAID linking remittances to 
development projects. Sheffer (2003 p. 173) also highlights “securing economic 
aid” as an important activity of diasporas. Considering the comparative 
advantages (Brinkerhoff 2010 p. 42-43) donor agencies and diasporas, such 
cooperation could indeed yield beneficial cooperation. 
However, it should be noted that the accumulation of resources is linked to the 
instrumentalisation highlighted by Brinkerhoff. Diasporas might want ownership 
of development resources and a partnership rather than being a delivery agent of 
development projects formulated by others (ibid. p. 44). This is a concern echoed 
in policy-reports were it is stressed that the relationship should be characterised by 
partnership (see De Haas 2006). This interest is closely related to the economic 
maintenance function of diasporas in the receiving state (Sheffer 2003 p. 174).  
Furthermore, since diasporas have an inherently different relationship to the 
sending state from the receiving state, and presumable different priorities in 
resource transfers, divergent opinions regarding optimal uses of resources could 
be present. Both the relationship between diasporas and receiving states, as well 
as resource priorities, are symptoms of the same issue, namely the question of 
ownership of the development projects.  
 
Argument 2: Contending interests will arise in the economic sphere regarding 
ownership of development projects and the uses of development resources. 
3.2.3 Cultural sphere 
The relationship between diasporas and receiving states in the cultural sphere is 
well documented considering the centrality of integration in migration studies. 
The relationship is one that may range from assimilation or intermingling to 
ethnic polarisation with conflict, sometimes violent, as consequence (see Esman 
2009). Esman (2009 p. 117-118) notes that an important role of diaspora 
organisations is serving cultural as well as practical needs. Sheffer states (2006 p. 
175) that many activities in the cultural sphere, such as festivals and other 
promotional events, serves to “increase ethnic awareness and a sense of identity 
among diasporans”.  
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Despite the importance placed on culture in diaspora studies, the role of 
culture in development cooperation between receiving states and diasporas has not 
received similar attention. Meanwhile, it has been found that cultural solidarity, 
along with levels of political organisation and economic resources, is an important 
determinant of mobilisation within the diaspora for the homeland (King & Melvin 
1999 p. 132-133). Furthermore, while neither economic or knowledge transfers 
from the diaspora to the homeland are necessarily cultural flows, studies have 
argued that diasporas, may promote understanding and “cultural competencies” 
gained in host countries (Brinkerhoff 2008 p. 10). Therefore, cultural factors 
should be important in development cooperation.   
As Brinkerhoff asserts, a degree of adaptation is demanded from donors when 
instrumentalising diasporas for development. On the one hand, diaspora 
organisations may resist the degree of professionalism and administrative 
improvement that donor agencies require. On the other hand, if they do not, then 
the new administrative structures might erase their comparative advantage by 
distancing them from the local grassroots perspective (Brinkerhoff 2011 p. 43).  
The diaspora organisation has among the primary aims to ensure the continuation 
and preservation of the common identity of the diaspora. Therefore, resistance to 
organisational isomorphism could be rational as well as cultural not least since 
many perceived comparative advantages of diasporas are a result of a special 
identity with dual understanding. Therefore, “[w]hile donors and COO 
governments may be able to access these comparative advantages by working 
with diasporas for development, their ability to instrumentalise diasporas […] is 
limited by the drivers that inspire diasporans’ engagement in the ﬁrst place” 
(Brinkerhoff 2011 p. 43). Furthermore, if diaspora organisations professionalise, 
the sending country might come to perceive them as competitors for donor 
money, countering their mediating and advantageous role (ibid. p. 45). This would 
sever the relationship to the homeland. Consequently, the expected degree of 
professional integration could be an area of contention. 
 
Argument 3: Government agencies will expect diaspora organisations to 
adapt to bureaucratic and professional standards whereas diasporas will resist 
adaptation on account of cultural integrity. 
3.2.4 Societal sphere 
Sheffer (2003 p. 173) states that organisations are established within the societal 
sphere to maintain associations and cooperation as well as coexistence with other 
groups, both majority groups, minorities and other diasporas. Furthermore, many 
promotional activities are aimed at increasing the size of the organisation and 
ensuring visibility as well as homeland contacts (Sheffer 2003 p. 175). Therefore, 
the maintenance and promotion of the organisation and its’ relationship with other 
organisations and groups are all important aspects of the diaspora within the 
societal sphere. This should not least be important considering that competing 
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attitudes and narrative about the homeland always are present among diasporas 
(ibid. pp. 153-154). 
Understandably, considering the broad and vague function of diasporas in the 
societal sphere, it is not commonly used as a starting point to discuss the rather 
policy-oriented field of development engagement. One issue of importance in this 
sphere is however touched upon in several studies regarding diasporas and 
development, as well as previously in this paper, namely fragmentation within the 
diaspora. Horst (2013 pp. 233-235) identifies the lack of unity within the diaspora 
as a problem in the cooperation on development issues with government agencies 
and NGOs. The lack thereof is supposedly problematic since officials are unable 
to identify representatives, and collaboration with the community as a whole 
becomes unviable. The same problem was identified by Vammen & Brønden 
(2012 p. 33). Horst (2013 pp. 238-239) concludes that attempts to externally 
foster unity among the diaspora are ill-informed considering the nature of 
conflict-generated diasporas. For instance, clan-based systems that can be divisive 
often form important networks for diasporas in conflict-situations. Similarly, an 
important point is that while the actor “diaspora” often figures in policy 
documents, the coherent, homogenous diaspora could be constructed and 
therefore attributed (Faist 2010 p. 19) rather than derived from experience.  
The interest among organisations for cooperation will presumably vary, since 
cooperation and co-existence are wanted in the societal sphere, but co-existence 
presupposes longevity and integrity of the individual organisation, why full 
merging of organisations should be unlikely. Therefore, the emphasis placed on 
unity among the different actors merits attention. 
  
Argument 4: A contention of interest could arise in the societal sphere as 
government agencies will seek unitary diaspora actors, while unity is not 
necessarily an aim among diasporas. 
 
All four arguments depart from the expected function of diaspora organisations 
and the argument is deduced from the expected, and sometimes observed, 
implications of this function. There is a semantic difference between them, since a 
contention of interest could arise in the first and last argument while it will arise in 
the remaining two. This is simply a reflection of the ambiguous implications of 
the diasporas’ function in these spheres. In the other spheres the implications are 
more unequivocal. It should also be stressed that the purpose of these arguments is 
not to be opposed or upheld, but rather to function as a heuristic tool to capture 
the dynamics within the identified sphere of importance. These arguments will 
constitute the core of the data collection, which will be detailed in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 1 – Summary of the deduced arguments  
- Argument 1: Contending interests could arise in the political sphere between 
diasporas and government agencies as diasporas seek political influence. 
 
- Argument 2: Contending interests will arise in the economic sphere regarding 
ownership of development projects and the uses of development resources. 
 
- Argument 3: Government agencies will expect diaspora organisations to adapt 
to bureaucratic and professional standards whereas diasporas will resist 
adaptation on account of cultural integrity. 
 
- Argument 4: A contention of interest could arise in the societal sphere as 
government agencies will seek unitary diaspora actors, while unity is not 
necessarily an aim among diasporas. 
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4 Methodology 
This chapter will address the methodological considerations involved in the 
achievement of the present purpose. Three main issues will be discussed in turn, 
namely the case study design, interview methodology and method of data 
analysis. 
4.1 Case design 
In order to answer the research question and to provide suitable means to satisfy 
the thesis’ ambitions, a case study design will be adopted. The study will focus on 
a single case, namely development cooperation with the Somali diaspora in 
Sweden.  
A case study is suitable to theory-building since it allows for new, a priori 
undetermined insights (George & Bennett 2005 pp. 20-21). In relation, the case-
study both recognises that the investigation is carried out within a context, without 
having to predetermine what is context and what is phenomena (Yin 2003 p. 13). 
In other words, case studies can provide insights that would be missed when using 
statistics or comparative methods were variables are predetermined and 
unchangeable.  
There have been several classifications of case studies (cf Lijphart 1971 pp. 
691-693, Yin 2003 pp. 40-42, Lieberman 2005 pp. 444-446). These are usually 
related to their theoretical or empirical properties in relation to previous findings. 
However, considering the lack of previous findings on this topic, such an 
approach is not suitable.  
 This paper instead works similarly to what George and Bennett (2005 p. 75) 
calls a “plausibility probe”. In these studies, a study is conducted in a previously 
unfamiliar context to explore if the area warrants attention. It is an exploratory 
study that bear similarities to what Yin (2003 p. 41) calls a “revelatory case 
study”. Yin notes that case studies are warranted when researchers get access to 
previously inaccessible material. However, the aforementioned criteria seems to 
assume that only previously inaccessible material has not been investigated. The 
(in)accessibility of the material should not sensibly be important to the research 
relevance from a theoretical perspective. Relevance should rather depart from the 
previous research independent of accessibility. As mentioned previously, the 
scarce theoretical work on the topic of dynamics of interest in one of the key 
aspects of this paper.   
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4.1.1 Generalizability 
Generalisation is a contested concept in case study designs (Yin 2003 p. 10-11, 
Gomm et al. 2000 p. 5). Indeed, this study does not seek survey-like or 
experimental generalisation to a population. Rather, it will strive for what have 
been termed ”analytic generalisation” (Yin 2003 p. 10). The distinction between 
statistical and analytical generalisation is key. The statistical generalisation seeks 
generalisation from “sample” to “population” but neither concept is applicable in 
the case study. Instead, generalisations are made from case to theory (ibid. p. 38).  
Furthermore, it can be argued that a misconception about generalisation is that 
is has to be based on a representative sample. However, even in statistical 
generalisation, all generalising activity is not based on the representativeness of 
the sample. Statistical generalisations are always accompanied by theoretical 
explanations and the representativeness of the sample is irrelevant for this logical 
inference (Mitchell 2000 p. 175). The aim of this case study is the latter 
generalisation, the logical inference from case to theory. The case study can 
furthermore analytically suppress the particular and contextual features of the case 
and aim for the essential and conceptual (ibid. p. 181) which indeed is the attempt 
here.  
Moreover, the theory this paper seeks generalisations to is a middle-range 
theory, that is theory regarding a sub-set of a more extensive phenomenon 
(George & Bennett 2005 p. 144). The sub-set in this paper is development 
cooperation with conflict-generated diasporas. 
4.1.2 Case selection – Development cooperation with the Somali 
diaspora in Sweden 
Before commenting on the relevance of the case selection a rather brief empirical 
background about Somalia, the diaspora and Swedish development cooperation 
will be presented.  
Somalia suffered a regime and state collapse in 1991 following two decades of 
dictatorial rule by Mohamed Siad Barre. Since then, the state has been at near 
perpetual crisis of violent conflict, famine and natural disaster (Zeid & Cochran 
2014 p. 4). An illustration of the situation is that Somalia has been ranked as the 
worlds’ most fragile state in the annual “Failed state index” since the index’s 
inception in 2005 (Fund for Peace 2014).  
A discussion about the causes and drivers of conflict in Somalia is beyond the 
scope of this paper but a short review, although admittedly simplified, is helpful 
to the analysis. Somalia is rather homogenous in terms of ethnicity, religion and 
language Divisions are instead usually identified within clan or kinship systems 
(Kimenyi et al. 2010 p. 1348, Lewis 2004 p. 492, Webersik 2004 p. 516). 
Clanship has been linked to uneven distribution of resources (Webersik 2004). 
During the period of state collapse, the northern regions Somaliland and Puntland 
furthermore unilaterally declared themselves independent and autonomous 
respectively making the relations between South-Central Somalia, Puntland and 
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Somaliland difficult (International Crisis Group 2009 pp. 10, 12-13, International 
Crisis Group 2012 pp. 9-10). It has been argued that political identities with 
tendencies to exacerbate conflict have been constructed in the northern regions 
(Höhne 2006). 
In the face of absent state institutions, the diaspora is considered to have been 
of great importance. For instance, it has been argued that “[r]emittances have been 
far more important for the survival of people than development and humanitarian 
aid put together” (Gundel 2002 p. 277).  
Moreover, some cautious optimism have been voiced over recent 
developments in Somalia and the prospects for development. Perhaps most 
importantly a post-transitional government is now in place made of a leadership 
with relatively little involvement in the flawed previous political process and the 
rebel group Al-Shabaab have suffered setbacks (Hammond 2013 pp. 185-188).  
Sweden was in 2012 the fifth largest individual donor to Somalia and the 
second largest within Europe (AidFlows 2014). Somalia was furthermore the 
eight largest beneficiary of Swedish bilateral aid in 2013 (Sida 2014). The 
development cooperation between the countries is therefore considerable. 
Moreover, in the Swedish development strategy for Somalia it was asserted that it 
is important to “make use of the competence present in the Somali diaspora 
outside of Somalia” (Utrikesdepartementet 2013 p. 4). Some initiatives 
corresponding to this ambition has been actualised, such as “Somaliaprogrammet” 
(Forum Syd)  
What is deemed important when selecting the revelatory case for this thesis is 
the potential for theoretical insights that could contribute to theory at a more 
general level. Therefore, the case is selected according to the presence of factors 
that should frame interests and therefore be conductive to theoretical insight. The 
diaspora adhere from a country just emerging from conflict, thereby constituting a 
conflict generated diaspora. The diaspora has played an active role supporting the 
homeland given the 20-year absence of a functioning central government. The 
diaspora have furthermore been active in setting up diaspora organisations. The 
Swedish government has explicitly stated its ambition to make use of the 
competencies of the diaspora. There could be fragmentation within the diaspora 
from Somalia since they adhere from and could identify with different regions and 
clans. Consequently, many of the factors that are likely to frame the interests of 
the actors, are present in this case and the case should therefore generate 
important findings.  
4.2 Interview methodology 
To achieve the aims articulated in this thesis, semi-structured interviews will be 
conducted. Semi-structured interviews form a middle ground between 
standardised and focused interviews. This format allows for the respondents to 
formulate answers more on their own terms than the structured interview, while at 
the same time allowing for some comparability between answers that would be 
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difficult in an unstructured format (May 2011 pp. 134-136). The former aspect is 
important to advance the papers purpose of not just judging the four arguments, 
but also enabling a fuller understanding of the interests involved. The latter aspect 
is important since comparability of answers is central to understanding how the 
interests of various actors relate.  
4.2.1 Epistemological approach  
This section will clarify how the collected data is understood. Qualitative 
interviews could be described as “guided conversation” where the researcher is 
seeking meaning and interpretations using a constructivist lens (Warren 2002). 
Silverman (1993 pp. 90-91) makes a distinction between positivist and 
interactionist, where the former is interested in “facts” collected through 
interviews, while the latter is concerned with accessing experiences of 
respondents. Therefore, it is a method permissive to several epistemological 
standpoints. 
This thesis departs from a critical realist epistemology. Therefore, the material 
will not be treated within a strictly social constructivist perspective. Interests 
could be argued to be less subjective than experiences or perceptions. Interests 
mainly relate to attitudes, motives and thoughts about what should be done. 
Silverman (1993 p. 92) suggests all of these are approachable from a positivist 
perspective. Still, it is not argued that interests are easily observable. It is however 
argued that interests are not solely a product of our subjective understanding of 
them.  
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the constructivist perspective and 
the critical point that the interviewer frames the questions and could interpret the 
answer in certain, often predetermined, ways. Using open, rather than restricted, 
questions should denounce the impact of the researcher in predetermining the 
answers. In other words, the variables sought will be predetermined but the 
classification of the answers will be open (Teorell & Svensson 2007 p. 90).   
In conclusion and in accordance with the critical realist theoretical 
underpinnings, interests and the influences on them will be understood as being 
independent of our understanding of them. However, they will in contradiction to 
positivism, be treated as unobservable in the sense that they cannot, for instance, 
be accessed by a grading a scale of “how interested” one is. Rather, in this case, 
they must be sought by hearing the respondent refer to facts, attitudes and 
motives, as well as more subjective aspects, such as values, and then deduced.  
4.2.2 Respondents 
The respondents are selected on the basis of their experience with development 
cooperation between the diaspora and governmental agencies. The cooperation is 
therefore non-hypothetical and the respondents can both provide information 
about their experience of the cooperation as well as information about the 
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cooperation itself. Therefore, the respondents will be treated as “experts” or 
“elites”. The term elite interviewing has no definite meaning. It has been applied 
to interviews with respondents who hold a “privileged position in society” 
(Richards 1996 p. 199). A more open conception will be adopted here and an elite 
interview will refer to interviews where “it is appropriate to treat a respondent as 
an expert about a topic at hand” (Leech 2002a p. 663).  
Respondents were selected using snowball sampling were members of the 
elite were contacted and asked to provide names to others involved in 
development cooperation (May 2011 p. 145). It should be noted that that this is a 
non-probability sample method and the total amount of interviews could be 
considered relatively low. Therefore, the representativeness of the sample is 
problematic. However, this is not central to this paper for two reasons. First, 
interviewing respondents with experience from development cooperation reduces 
the potential respondents. It would furthermore always be difficult to generalize 
the findings from respondents with this experience to the diaspora or government 
without it. Second, the importance is not the commonality of certain statements 
but rather the theoretical meaning of statements. Therefore, it is mainly important 
to reach a degree of satiation, where new input becomes scarce (Ryen 2004 pp. 
85-87).  
In total, 10 respondents were interviewed.
5
 5 of the respondents are members 
of the Somali diaspora, 4 of the respondents are civil servants from government 
agencies. 1 respondent is working for Forum Syd, a development organisation that 
on a mandate from Sida
6
 is a major dispenser of Swedish development assistance. 
It is important to notice that during the analysis the last respondent will be 
gathered in the group ”governmental respondents”. This is technically wrong 
despite the agency given mandate of the organisation. Whenever deemed relevant, 
the special position of the respondent will be pointed out however.  
To increase the likelihood that as many theoretically interesting points as 
possible could be put forward, some heterogeneity among the respondents was 
ensured. Half of the respondents were men and half were women.
7
 Among the 
diaspora, the respondents had background from all three regions. The 
governmental respondents all came from different positions and agencies covering 
both the local and the national level. Repetitions became quite common during the 
last interviews in both groups and it was concluded that additional interviews 
would add little in terms of theoretical relevance.  
4.2.3 Interview technique 
Regarding the interview guide, Leech argues that the best type of questions are 
”grand tour questions” where ”questions ask for a tour based on some parameter 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5
 See Appendix 8.2 for a complete list of respondents. 
6
 The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. 
7
 3 of the respondents in the diaspora were women and 2 of the respondents from government agencies. 
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decided by the interviewer - a day a topic an event […]” (Leech 2002b p. 667). 
These questions are beneficial since the respondent should respond at length 
regarding the subject matter posited by the interviewer (ibid. p. 667). These 
questions were employed in the interview guide. The key questions were mainly 
treated as sub-questions to grand tour questions. The grand tour questions 
furthermore gave the respondent the possibility to put forward other important 
points and to approach the issue from their perspective. Limited previous 
research, increased response validity and resistance among elites to being forced 
into answers are further benefits of using open question (Aberbach & Rockman 
2002 p. 674) that are all applicable in this paper. 
Some general means to gain rapport were employed such as displaying 
attentiveness, allowing the respondent to talk uninterrupted and, importantly, 
briefly presenting the research topic (Leech 2002b p. 666). Practically, a non-
threatening question where the respondent was asked to provide a summary of 
development cooperation work that the respondent had experience of, was 
selected as the opening question. Apart from starting of the conversation, it also 
allowed for a display of interest and attentiveness. Another employed technique 
was to refer to previous interviews once a set of interviews had been carried out 
(Richards 1996 p. 203). This also allowed for interesting discussions with the 
subsequent respondent. The interview guide can be found in the appendix. 
4.2.4 Interview notes 
The interviews lasted for between about 30 and 70 minutes. All interviews were 
not recorded, partly at the request of a respondent and partly because some of the 
interview settings did not practically allow for audio recording. The lack thereof 
does not constitute a problem in the thesis since the exact wording and interaction 
are not central to the analysis. Attentiveness and careful note-taking are sufficient 
for capturing the main attitude, topic and reason given. 8 of the respondents were 
interviewed in person while 2 were interviewed by telephone. 
4.3 Method of analysis 
In order to answer the research question the interviews must be analysed 
systematically and the analysis must capture the interests involved in the answers. 
Since interests are present across the entire interview guide and since the 
interviews were semi-structured and the interview guide was not exactly 
replicated in all interviews, the need for systematic review of the collected 
interview data is further underlined.  
In order to systematically code the material for interests, a coding method 
called “evaluation coding” was employed (Saldaña 2013 pp. 119-123). The 
method can be defined as “the application of (primarily) non-quantitative codes to 
qualitative data that assign judgment about the merit, worth, or significance of 
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programs or policy” (ibid. p. 119). Indeed, this paper is interested in precisely 
such judgments and the interests associated with these judgments. It should be 
noted that this paper is not solely or mainly interested in evaluating a policy or 
program, even though it is a natural component of the topic. Still, the usefulness 
of this method is apparent. 
In essence, evaluation coding combines an eclectic set of codes that are 
appropriate for the study and the policy or program under evaluation (ibid. p. 120) 
First, comments and statements will be coded to be either positive, negative, 
neutral or mixed (see ibid. p. 74). These attitudes do not cover a fifth category, 
prescriptive statements. Since prescriptive statements in the interview data are 
frequent, partly as a result of the topic at hand and partly as a result of the 
interview guide, such comments will be accompanied by a code indicating 
prescription. Second, comments will be coded descriptively according to the topic 
they refer to, such as re-integration, development funds, a particular agency etc. 
These codes are not determined a priori but constructed as the analysis moves on. 
Third, comments are coded with regard to the particular reason given for the 
statement.  
The coding procedure defined up until this point can be called “first cycle 
coding” which is the process by which the material is organised into individual, 
separate segments (ibid. p. 51). After this point the codes will be coded according 
to concepts at a higher level of abstraction. This can be called “second cycle 
coding” where “a sense of categorical, thematic, conceptual and/or theoretical 
organization from [the] first array of First Cycle codes” is developed (ibid. p. 
207). Therefore, the forth step is to code the segments as being situated in the 
political, economic, cultural or societal sphere.  
By applying this coding scheme (see Table 2), comments that confirms, 
contradicts or problematizes the arguments and the reasons for these positions 
should be made clear. It should then work as a suitable basis for theoretical 
analysis of, and discussion about, the interests involved. 
 
Table 2 – Coding scheme 
Attitude Topic Reason Sphere 
POS(itive) 
NEG(ative) 
NEU(tral) 
MIX(ed) 
+ PRE(scriptive) 
i.e. 
SIDA 
Remittances 
Conference 
i.e. 
“lacks 
understanding” 
“raise awareness” 
“insecure 
financing” 
POL(itical) 
ECO(nomical) 
CUL(tural) 
SOC(ietal) 
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5 Analysis 
This chapter will be an integrated review of the empirical findings from the 
interviews and analysis thereof. Indeed, it can be stated that coding interviews in 
fact is analysis (Saldaña 2013 p. 8). A perfect distinction between empirical 
results and analysis would be somewhat artificial and needlessly complicated both 
in terms of substantive content as well as presentation. However, the empirical 
and theoretical dimension will be weighted differently in the subsequent sections. 
The empirics will take precedent in the first part while theory is emphasised in the 
second  
Before proceeding to the actual analysis, a few notes on the coding procedure 
will be made. The interview material was coded according to the model presented 
in the previous chapter. The attitude, topic and reason were coded and 
consequently spheres were coded. The topics were in general formulated on a 
quite general level reflecting the general focus of the interviews. Discussions were 
for instance often about the general topic “government agencies” rather than 
specific agencies. Therefore, when the topic “government agencies” is mentioned 
in the analysis, this is a reflection of the interviews and not a part of the analytic 
process. All respondents recorded positive and negative attitudes and furthermore 
gave prescriptions. Mixed attitudes were not as common but this is partly a result 
of longer statements being coded in part as negative and in part as positive for 
clarity. Neutral attitudes were uncommon. Partly, this could be because of the 
sensitive or multifaceted character of the topics, and partly it is a reflection of the 
experience and expert knowledge of the respondents on the issues. 
As mentioned the analysis departed from attitudes. Therefore, the codes do not 
cover descriptive passages. For instance, the first question in the interview guide 
about the respondents’ experience with cooperation between government and 
diaspora were not coded. Certain descriptive statements were coded as neutral 
statements when put forward in connection with attitudinal statements but not as a 
reason for the attitude. Furthermore, the codes were not used as a completely 
exhaustive summary of the material, and the interview notes or recordings were 
consulted were the analysis suggested it was relevant. For certain attitudes about 
certain topics several different codes were recorded if the reasons were 
theoretically distinct.   
The amount of codes differed widely between the different interview, 
depending on how many reasons were given for different attitudes, how much 
time that focused on descriptive statements, how in-depth the reasons given were 
and simply based on the specific structure and length of the interview. 
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5.1 Analysis of the arguments 
The following analysis will be divided into discussions about each of the 
arguments. Each section will deliberate a sphere and the accompanying argument. 
In general, the responses from the diaspora are discussed first, followed by the 
governmental respondents. Lastly, a section entitled “Other themes” consisting of 
themes not covered when departing from the arguments will be presented. 
5.1.1 Political sphere  
As mentioned previously, this is a question employing the word “could” to 
indicate uncertainty based on the possibility of internally contradictive 
implications of the diasporas function in the political sphere. Indeed, the 
interviews suggests there is ambiguity surrounding this question. None of the 
respondents claimed political influence to be an issue of contention or importance 
in the interviews. No statements about the topics political influence, Somali 
geopolitics, political parties etc. were recorded. However, several points with a 
political dimension were put forward, mainly among the diaspora.  
While political topics such as the ones proposed above were absent, several 
reasons for attitudes about certain topics dealt with the geopolitics of Somalia. 
Mostly, the attitudes in these statements were negative. One respondent pointed 
out that a comprehensive approach to Somali development is missing among 
development agencies, and that projects tend to be aimed at Somaliland and 
Puntland, while South-Central Somalia is more disregarded.  
 
“[I]t is a bit complicated because of the situation in Somalia. You have to work with 
different regions and get people from different regions for it to work. It becomes a bit 
like you either direct efforts at Somaliland or Puntland and not on the southern part 
because the security situation is like it is” (Respondent 1, 2014).  
 
The respondent did not argue that the misdistribution was politically motivated, 
but simply that the relatively more secure climate in those regions made them 
more accessible. Meanwhile, another respondent argued that it was important for 
agencies to look beyond Mogadishu and pay attention to the regions, for instance 
through visits (Respondent 5, 2014). A third respondent argued that the Swedish 
government should not, when seeking partners among the diaspora in Sweden, 
base this evaluation on affiliation to different regions in Somalia because that 
approach creates friction and divisions within the diaspora (Respondent 2, 2014).  
The statements above are not entirely conflicting, nor are they referring to the 
exact same phenomena. However, all statements contain negative attitudes or 
prescriptions about the topic “government agencies” in their approach to the 
regional landscape of Somalia. Furthermore, they all indicate that the geo-politics 
of Somalia is present in development cooperation. Meanwhile, political topics and 
reasons were visible absent and the overriding theme among the reasons in the 
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answers above is a fear of friction or misdistribution in Somalia and the diaspora, 
rather than the advancement of a particular agenda or the political aspirations of 
certain regions. In other words, the statements are defensive rather than offensive.  
Meanwhile, no respondent argued that government agencies should not be 
involved. The prescriptive statements about government agencies did not call for 
less government efforts but rather different or even more activity. The respondent 
who claimed Swedish authorities got too involved in Somali internal affairs stated 
that they could do more to create a cooperative atmosphere among the diaspora 
and formulate suggestions (Respondent 2, 2014). One of the respondent even felt 
Swedish agencies was too careful in approaching diaspora organizations with 
suggestions about cooperation between diaspora organizations, especially 
regarding political issues (Respondent 1, 2014).  
Among the respondents from governmental actors, no respondent named 
politics as a major challenge when asked to freely discuss the topic. When 
negative attitudes were given about the topics “diaspora partners” or “diaspora 
organisations”, the reasons given never referred explicitly to political aspirations 
or political incentives.  
The respondent from Forum Syd elaborated quite extensively on the issue of 
politics and politically sensitive questions however. The respondent stated that 
Forum Syd had an experience of working with the diaspora that predated the 
policy-formulation of “diaspora” in Sweden. The purpose of cooperation from the 
beginning did not depart from the phrase “diaspora” but rather from the capacity 
of the actors, diasporas or not (Respondent 10, 2014). However, the current 
policy-wording of “diaspora” may entail difficulties;  
 
“For agencies, when they want to involve the diaspora in some processes they will ask 
‘who is the diaspora?’ […] in a country like Somalia with different levels of conflict 
[…] it becomes obvious that one doesn’t feel included because who are you, who is the 
diaspora?” (Respondent 10, 2014)  
 
In fact, Forum Syd themselves encountered the problem of representation among 
the diaspora in the formation of an advisory board. They later opted for replacing 
this board by another one made up of partners they had long standing 
relationships with (Respondent 10, 2014). However, the respondent stressed that 
governmental representatives should not be afraid of the political incentives of 
diasporas since politics is an important motivation among diasporas (Respondent 
10, 2014).  
The issue of representation was not raised either as a topic or as a reason by 
the other respondents even if many points aligned with the statement above. One 
respondent mentioned that the government usually preferred to work with one 
partner which posed a challenge when tasked with working with the diaspora 
(Respondent 8, 2014). The respondent did not mention representative issues 
however. In fact, the respondent expressed exclusively positive attitudes about the 
diaspora partners of whom the respondent had experience working with. The 
respondent stated that one particularly rewarding aspect was how practical and 
pragmatic the diaspora actors in question had been. The respondent moreover 
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stated that partners were something that evolved in this process (Respondent 8, 
2014) which corresponds with the statement by Respondent 5 that long-term 
partners were easier to work with. 
One respondent furthermore pointed out that it could be a trap to just “back 
the diaspora” unconditionally and thus loosing goal-orientation (Respondent 9, 
2014). The same respondent also stated that among the international community 
engagements certain actors could be described as a “traveling Tivoli” that often 
attend conflict- and post conflict areas, meeting and events but that mainly 
represent their own interests rather than those of local development actors or 
diaspora (Respondent 9, 2014). The respondent did not however claim that these 
interests are political.  
Lastly, several respondents, both from the diaspora and the government held 
positive attitudes about development policy areas or projects that could be 
categorized in the political sphere. These included good governance (Respondent 
9, 2014), wages for people in political functions (Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 
2, 2014), gender, equality and sustainable development (Respondent 10, 2014). 
One governmental respondent was slightly less optimistic about getting people 
from the diaspora into political positions. The respondent did not reject such 
strategies but merely explained the challenge in funding people in political 
functions. Such positions are very expensive on account of the security situation 
on the ground in Somalia (Respondent 6, 2014). This is an economic rather than 
political consideration.  
Consequently, contending interests about politics in development does not 
seem to be a comprehensive, if even manifestable, issue. The political dimension 
however underpins several conflicting attitudes in the cooperation. The issue of 
representation seems to be a sensitive issue, particularly for the diaspora. Indeed, 
the preference of the government to work with one partner could easily come into 
conflict here. However, the positive experience of the respondent who brought it 
up suggests it is not an insurmountable issue.  
5.1.2 Economic sphere 
In this sphere the predicted area of contention is ownership. When negative 
attitudes were expressed about the topics “Government agencies”, “Diaspora 
partners” or “Division of Responsibility” no reasons given indicated that the other 
party sought too much control or overreached in exercising control. Despite no 
firm divide, there were several points made pointing to some conflicting interests, 
even within both the diaspora and the governmental actors.   
Among the diaspora, there seemed to be overall recognition that the general 
division of responsibility was clear and relatively well-functioning when 
discussing the general procedure for seeking projects (Respondent 2, 2014, 
Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014, Respondent 5, 2014). All respondents 
recorded positive attitudes regarding this point. However, several respondents 
expressed negative attitudes on topics associated with this process. Two 
respondents recorded a negative attitude regarding Government agencies because 
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of the limited inclusion of diaspora actors. Two respondents argued that while the 
procedure for seeking project-funding was rather unproblematic, the formulation 
of issue-areas wherein projects could be financed was flawed. The respondents 
argued that the diaspora should be included, particularly by Sida, at an earlier 
stage in the formulation of issue-areas. This way their input could be more 
reflected in the final development projects (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 
2014). One respondent did not share this experience but stated that the attitude is 
not uncommon; “I usually meet a lot of other associations that think that ‘Somali-
Swedes, why can’t we be involved in the process from the moment it starts?’. But, 
me and the women’s organisation have good cooperation” (Respondent 2, 2014).  
Furthermore, several negative attitudes were expressed when the topic 
“Swedish aid” was brought up and notably no positive attitudes were expressed. 
Especially problematic was the channelling of funds through multilateral channels 
such as the UN and IOM. Respondents argued that these were ineffective and 
inappropriate to their purpose (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014), that 
results did not show on the ground (Respondent 2, 2014), and that they were 
perceived as a lack of trust in and by the diaspora and Somali society (Respondent 
1, 2014). 
 Among the governmental actors there were some disagreements on the topics 
discussed and on the semantics involved. The respondent from Forum Syd stated 
that their relationship with the diaspora should be described as “partnership” 
rather than “coordination”; “We see more than the funding, rather what we 
ourselves can accomplish in terms of gender perspective, equality, rights and 
sustainable development. To achieve this I see it as a partnership” (Respondent 
10, 2014). Similarly, one respondent said that it took time to convince members of 
the diaspora that one was interested in a genuine “partnership” (Respondent 7, 
2014). Meanwhile, another respondent argued that it was important that the 
relationship was described as “coordination” rather than “cooperation”. The 
reason being that cooperation could be seen as a privileged position that could be 
used by diaspora actors against other diaspora actors and governmental actors 
(Respondent 9, 2014). Another respondent argued that more inclusion and more 
use of working group formats were important in the road ahead (Respondent 6, 
2014). The last statement at least indicates that the division of responsibility or 
ownership had not become an overwhelming, or even a substantial, problem.  
Therefore, there was no apparent agreement on how the cooperative measures are, 
or should be, described.  
Problems about Swedish aid were also voiced by governmental actors, 
although not to the same extent. Still, some negative attitudes on the topic were 
recorded. One respondent argued the current development funds were not 
accustomed to transnational work or actors and that a change in this regard is 
necessary (Respondent 8, 2014). Another respondent also claimed one often turn 
to other donors, such as USAID, to finance projects that provide conditions for re-
migration, such as constructions of building. Swedish funds are too narrowly 
aimed at the migration-aspect of return migration and not the conditions that are 
necessary for this to be possible (Respondent 7, 2014). Both respondents argued 
that to associate “migration” with “integration” was too narrow an approach and 
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that a broader picture of migration was needed in governmental agencies and in 
general (Respondent 7, 2014, Respondent 8, 2014).  
It is noticeable that the governmental and diaspora respondents in many cases 
referred to different aspects of Swedish aid. One type of project where directly 
conflicting interests was visible was internships. One governmental respondent 
put forward internships in Somalia, in combination with guidance or education as 
being beneficial models to involve the diaspora in the development of Somalia 
(Respondent 9, 2014). Two respondents were however highly critical of 
internships because of the limited if existent compensation. They argued that it 
was contradictory that skilled workers should return but little or no compensation 
was available (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014). 
A commonly emphasized phrase when providing reasons for topics regarding 
the governmental approach to diaspora partners was “suggest(ion)” (Interview 
with Respondent 1, 2014, Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 7, 2014) as opposed to 
more forceful appeals. This phrase that was often used in prescriptive statements 
was put forward by several of the diaspora respondents as well as one government 
respondent. This approach also underlines a will to have ownership over projects, 
although not at the expense of the governmental agencies. 
Consequently, there seem to be some validity to the argument that ownership 
can be a contentious issue, although not as saliently as expected. It does not seem 
as if any party believes the ownership of projects is problematic. The contending 
issue instead seems to be the perceived late inclusion of the diaspora. Some 
respondents felt the Swedish development work was misdirected and felt unable 
to change this, validating the expected lack of ownership of priorities. In this 
sense there seems to be scepticism of being treated as delivery agents. Meanwhile, 
the governmental actors were quite split regarding topics related to diaspora 
ownership, but most persons involved expressed no comments about overreach, or 
unrealistic aspirations in the diaspora. 
It should also be underscored that the expected mutual interests in the sphere 
given the neo-liberal paradigm were confirmed to some extent. Several positive 
attitudes about the topic “business” were expressed. Two respondents from the 
diaspora and from governmental agencies stated business as being an important 
element of the continued development in Somalia (Respondent 2, 2014, 
Respondent 5, 2014, Respondent 6, 2014, Respondent 9, 2014). The topic was not 
brought up in the other interviews so no disagreements in this point were 
observable.   
5.1.3 Cultural sphere 
The issue of lacking administrative and bureaucratic functions was brought up 
quite frequently, mainly among the diaspora. All respondents from the diaspora 
touched upon topics and reasons related to administration and paperwork. One 
respondent said that the administration involved in projects were heavy relative to 
the capacity of diaspora organization; “[Diaspora associations] have had problems 
that the accounting is inadequate, both in terms of knowledge and in development 
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questions, Forum Syd and others have complained that […] they do not receive 
sufficient data and information in joint projects” (Respondent 1, 2014). Two 
respondents admitted that the administrative demands were high but that it was 
manageable and neither said it had had detrimental effects in their experience 
(Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 5, 2014) and one even put forward some 
positive aspect of it;  
 
“There is always criteria one has to fulfil. In one way you’re forced because you can’t 
come up with just anything […] One the other hand it is right that you need rules, 
criteria and indicators to do what you’re supposed to […] It was positive with demands 
that we get to where we were supposed to, as we wrote in the application” (Respondent 
5, 2014).  
 
Two were critical of the administrative burden placed on diaspora organization 
seeking project funding because it was perceived as an unreasonable amount of 
administration in relation to the received support. The respondents highlighted 
that often project plans had to cover longer periods than financing could be 
secured for (Respondent 3, 2014, Respondent 4, 2014). The respondents 
contrasted this procedure with other aid organizations, such as Diakonia
8
, who 
they experienced, got preferential funding and access (Respondent 3, 2014, 
Respondent 4, 2014).  
Still, it is important to emphasize that the negative attitudes were in general on 
the topic “Diaspora organization” or “Projects” and not “Governmental agencies”. 
Therefore, is was the lacking capacity of diaspora organisations, rather than the 
administrative demands by governmental agencies, that was negatively perceived. 
The statements by the last two respondents above serve as the main exception to 
this rule since they expressed negative attitudes towards the administrative 
demands. 
One governmental respondent echoed the concerns above and stated that 
administrative knowledge and capacity were the biggest challenges for diaspora 
organizations, along with keeping focus on the action plan during the execution of 
the project (Respondent 9, 2014). No other respondent placed particular emphasis 
on the lacking administrative capacity of diaspora organizations. In contrast, the 
positive statement by one respondent that the diaspora organizations were 
surprisingly practical, pragmatic, competent and goal-oriented can be reiterated. 
The respondent also stated that very little time was spent focusing on cultural 
aspects or problems of communication (Respondent 8, 2014).  
Still, the adaptation of governmental bureaucratic standards seems to pose a 
challenge in the cooperation. However, little suggests this is a mainly cultural 
problem. The administrative burden is simply put into contrast with the 
administrative capacity or the value of the administrative burden. If capacity is the 
main issue then the reasoning is solely economic and not about contentious 
interests, but rather about constraints. If the merits of administration is questioned 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 Swedish christian aid organisation with operations in 30 countires. Among those Somalia (www.diakonia.se)   
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it is mainly an economic reason but could be interpreted as cultural if there are 
different cultural notions of how much administration is justified. However, even 
when the merits of administration were questioned, the workload was contrasted 
to that of other organizations. Therefore, little suggests that there is a cultural 
contention of interest regarding the administrative or bureaucratic adaption that is 
justified, at least at this stage.  
A more contending issue seems to be the issue-areas covered by development. 
As mentioned in the previous section, negative attitudes about Swedish aid were 
frequent, and a perception, especially among the diaspora, that Swedish aid was 
sub-optimally appropriated. Some respondents went on to stress that development 
agencies in Sweden in general
9
 had overestimated their own competence and 
knowledge regarding Somalia which led to flawed decisions (Respondent 3, 2014, 
Respondent 4, 2014). While not linking it to flawed competence, another 
respondent furthermore claimed that Swedish aid did not take into account the 
realities on the ground in Somalia, for instance the importance of agriculture 
(Respondent 2, 2014). One respondent did not comment on Swedish aid and 
instead emphasised that business was important to the development of Somalia. 
The respondent however claimed that the perception of Somalia in Sweden posed 
a challenge in business promotion (Respondent 5, 2014). 
Therefore, it is possible that the adaptation to Swedish standards is not so 
much a contending issue in the cultural sphere so much in terms of administrative 
adaptation as it is in terms of adaptation to Swedish priorities. There seem to, 
quite naturally, be different understandings of Somalia, the priorities in 
development and the execution thereof. It is visible that the diaspora experience a 
contradiction between their special knowledge they possess and the effect this 
knowledge is allowed to have on development policy.  
The issue is not overly contentious at this point however since several 
governmental respondents made points that align with some points made above. 
Indeed, positive attitudes regarding the diaspora were visible across of interview 
with governmental respondents. All governmental respondents stated that the 
diaspora had knowledge that is important to Somali development (Respondent 6, 
2014, Respondent 7, 2014, Respondent 8, 2014, Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 
10, 2014). One referred to the diasporas’ advantage as “attitude”, alluding to a 
form of contextual knowledge and capacity (Respondent 7, 2014). No respondent 
argued that the diaspora had been too included and some explicitly stated that 
work to continue to involve the diaspora was needed (Respondent 6, 2014, 
Respondent 7, 2014).  
Still, the contradiction between the diasporas’ knowledge and their input could 
indeed pose a challenge to development cooperation. This interest seems more 
offensive or proactive than the ones identified previously, since it involves the 
promotion of the home country according to the diasporas’ cultural understanding.  
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 Forum Syd was the only explicitly stated exception to this rule. 
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5.1.4 Societal sphere 
The issue of unity among diaspora actors was brought up frequently but not in 
ways corresponding perfectly to the argument.   
Several respondents among the diaspora raised concerns about the internal 
lack of coordination between diaspora actors. Most negative attitudes toward 
“diaspora organisations” or “projects” among the diaspora respondents were 
related to lack of coordination between different diaspora actors. The result of 
missing coordination is projects that are too small in size and no long-term 
perspective is viable. All the respondents believed that coordinated efforts, where 
resources could be divided between organisations as a result of joint planning, 
rather than competition, would be very beneficial (Respondent 1, 2014, 
Respondent 2, 2014, Respondent 5, 2014). One respondent had been involved in 
an attempt to gather organisations under an umbrella organisation to achieve this 
aim but with limited success (Respondent 1, 2014). No, respondent argued that 
organisational integrity or absorption of organisations into one another was a 
problem. 
Furthermore, no respondent explicitly stated that government request for unity 
was contentious issue. Rather, the respondent provided statements that reflected a 
contrary view. One respondent stated, as mentioned previously, that the 
government was too lenient in asking organisations to coordinate their efforts; 
“The agencies are nervous to call associations and say ‘but you have all applied 
for the same thing […] can’t you cooperate?’” (Respondent 1, 2014). Another 
respondent claimed that Forum Syd could be perceived as preferring small 
projects, while stressing it should not be interpreted as direct criticism 
(Respondent 2, 2014).  
It is also important to return to the remarks about friction within the diaspora. 
As mentioned previously, Swedish attempts to identify partners based on regional 
affiliation were deemed problematic by some respondents from the diaspora. One 
respondent who expressed this negative attitude stated that the issue of division 
within the diaspora was particularly problematic against the backdrop of civil-war 
and conflict in Somalia and that it had created conflict within the Somali diaspora 
in Sweden (Respondent 2, 2014). “It is a step forward that creates conflict; I don’t 
understand how the government spends money” (Respondent 2, 2014). The 
respondents however welcomed government agencies to do more to foster a good 
cooperative atmosphere (Respondent 2, 2014).  The creation of friction within the 
diaspora by the government when identifying representatives, were also stated by 
one respondent who labelled this “double morale” on the part of the government 
(Respondent 4, 2014). Consequently, many of the attitudes towards government 
agencies when discussing cooperative measures negative but several prescriptive 
statements contained proposals for more government activity.  
The governmental attempts to achieve representativeness could easily be 
based on an attempt to achieve unity, or at least some kind of unitary body that 
could be designated “diaspora”. This possibility is partly supported by the 
statement made by Respondent 5 about the problems of identifying partners by 
asking “who is he diaspora?”. Therefore, despite no respondent explicitly stating 
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that demands of unity by the government have posed a problem, some statements 
indeed supports the argument that unity could be a contentious issue. Still, unity 
in the sense “coordination” seems wanted among the diaspora. The respondent 
from Forum Syd stated that the only realistic way the diaspora to be represented 
was if the diaspora themselves could find a form of representative function or 
body. The respondent however noted that the diaspora had encountered 
difficulties in doing so (Respondent 10, 2014). The respondent also stated that 
coordination was predominantly important between diaspora organisations 
(Respondent 10, 2014). The other respondents did not comment on the internal 
coordination within the diaspora although the great amount of diaspora 
organisations were frequently put forward (Respondent 8, 2014, Respondent 9, 
2014, Respondent 10, 2014). One respondent stated in a neutral statement that at a 
mapping effort in the beginning of the 2000s’ there were 400 associations in 
Sweden (Respondent 9, 2014) and a second claimed there were 800 associations 
today (Respondent 10, 2014). Therefore, the amount of organisations is clearly a 
part of the considerations among the governmental actors.  
Moreover, the issue of how to handle the challenge of multiple organisations 
were brought up in the section about the political sphere. To reiterate, a 
respondent stated that it posed a challenge but no statement suggested it was not 
insurmountable problem. The respondent moreover had a very positive experience 
of the diaspora partners (Respondent 8, 2014). 
While discussing the identification of diaspora partners, several respondents 
stated capacity to achieve development goals and goal-orientation as being 
important in finding diaspora partners. Some statements were prescriptive in the 
sense that it was argued that capacity should be the determining factor in 
identifying partners. Other statements displayed a positive attitude about how 
diaspora partners had been successfully identified in the past based on capacity.  
One respondent discussed an initiative were applications were sent in for 
funds related to business and development. A suspiring amount of applications 
came from the Somali diaspora. The respondent stated with a positive attitude that 
the applications that were granted funds covered all three regions when capacity 
had been the only determining factor (Respondent 9, 2014). The respondent 
therefore seemed to conceive representativeness only as a positive by-product to 
the important determining factor, capacity. The same respondent stressed goal-
orientation as being central to all diaspora coordination (Respondent 9, 2014). 
One respondent, who said diaspora partnerships were a vital part of any work 
related to Somalia and the Somali context also stated capacity was the 
determining factor in finding partners (Respondent 7, 2014). The respondent from 
Forum Syd said their partnership were just like partnerships with any other 
organisation. The partnerships were result-oriented regardless of properties or 
names of organisations; “In a simple word it is ‘partnership’ with these Somali 
associations that are a part of the associational activity in Sweden and in this way 
we see these organisations […] that in later years have come to be called diaspora-
associations” (Respondent 10, 2014). Many respondents therefore shared a belief 
that the identification of diaspora partners should be based on capacity which 
should precede other considerations. The last respondent furthermore linked their 
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capacity-based partnerships to Forum Syds’ long experience in working with the 
diaspora and that beneficial partners therefore became clear after a process.  
The last statement echoes the discussion about the evolving character of 
partnerships under the section about the political sphere. However, the evolution 
of partnerships could be put into contrast with the perceived lack of long-term 
processes and concerns about longevity that was voiced by respondents from the 
diaspora.  
Consequently, no contention of interest as clear as the one put forward in the 
argument is visible in the societal sphere even though several interesting aspects 
were put forward. Perhaps surprisingly, concerns about the unity among the 
diaspora were most commonly put forward by members of the diaspora. While the 
large number of organisations was clearly a consideration among the 
governmental respondents, no statement suggests this is an unsurmountable issue. 
Therefore, some kind of unity seems to be an aim among the diaspora, even 
though coordination and cooperation and not fusion of organisations seem to be 
the preferred working model.  
Meanwhile, there indeed seem to be contention present when governmental 
agencies attempt to find representativeness and seek out groups based on their 
regional affiliation. On the other hand, many governmental respondents shared a 
positive attitude that capacity should be the main determinant of diaspora partners, 
as opposed to their name, status or other properties. Hence, it does not seem to be 
so much a sphere in which there are a general contending interest but rather as one 
were sensitive issues and interests are common and were clashes of interest could 
arise easily, possibly as a by-product. 
5.1.5 Other themes 
Before proceeding to a theoretical discussion about the dynamics of interest, three 
more themes that were not covered in the discussion related to the arguments 
above will be highlighted. These themes were inductively constructed without 
prior theoretical concepts. No themes that divided the governmental agencies and 
the diaspora were found but some themes were common among both sides. 
First, it is important to note that most respondents expressed positive attitudes 
towards cooperative measures between Government agencies and the diaspora in 
development assistance. The reasons given were mostly linked to the 
complementing resources of the two parties. Among the governmental 
respondents all respondents recorded some positive attitudes about cooperative 
measures (Respondent 6, 2014, Respondent 7, 2014, Respondent 8, 2014, 
Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 10, 2014). One respondent stated that 
coordination is beneficial since different actors are allowed take on different tasks 
for which they are well-suited (Respondent 9, 2014). One respondent stated that 
the diaspora could contribute with special expertise and contextual knowledge and 
that the partnership provides a platform for exchanging experiences and increase 
transparency (Respondent 10, 2014). One respondent went so far as to argue that 
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it was impossible to work with a different country without working with the 
diaspora (Respondent 7, 2014).  
Similar points were made by many respondents from the diaspora. One 
respondent stated that cooperative measures in general, not just in development 
assistance, are important to trust-building both among the diaspora and between 
the government and the diaspora. Trust is especially important considering the 
civil war in Somalia (Respondent 1, 2014). Another respondent stated 
governmental actors and diaspora actors brought complementary resources and 
that governmental financing makes more projects possible (Respondent 2, 2014). 
Another respondent furthermore stated that aside from financing, the cooperative 
measures were important since it allowed for consultations and different 
perspectives which is rewarding (Respondent 5, 2014).  
Second, another theme that came up during discussions was the importance of 
acknowledging gender and women empowerment in the development of Somalia. 
Several governmental respondents recorded positive attitudes about the inclusion 
of gender in the continued development (Respondent 9, 2014, Respondent 10, 
2014, Respondent 8, 2014). One respondent argued that female entrepreneurs are 
particularly important for the economy of Somali households and economy and 
should therefore be visible in development efforts (Respondent 9, 2014).  
Diaspora respondents also asserted the importance of gender (Respondent 1, 2014, 
Respondent 2, 2014). One of the respondents argued that this was particularly 
important since the upcoming national elections in 2016 is the first time Somali 
women will have an opportunity to vote (Respondent 2, 2014). 
Third, another theme was the constraining capacity in Somalia which was 
mostly put forward by the governmental respondents. The governmental 
respondents often referred to capacity in Somalia as a condition for diaspora 
engagement in development. One respondent stated that an important aspect to 
observe was how the local agencies in Somalia can make use of economic or other 
resources that the diaspora contribute with (Respondent 10, 2014). Another 
respondent said the capacity of local agencies must strengthen in order to receive 
the diaspora in ways that benefit Somali development (Respondent 9, 2014). One 
respondent also stated that the kinds of initiatives that are possible in the future 
are dependent on the development in Somalia (Respondent 6, 2014). What is 
important to note about this theme is the remainder that the situation in the 
developing country conditions the type of development assistance and therefore 
the form of cooperation that is possible with the diaspora.  
5.2 Theoretical implications 
In the preceding analysis several contentious issues are visible in a variety of 
spheres. Second, the interests and issues often overlap and affect issues in other 
spheres. In this section the findings above will be theoretically discussed and 
analysed with the aim of ending with a more parsimonious theoretical 
understanding of the dynamics of interest in development cooperation. First, the 
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face validity of the arguments will be reviewed and the implication on theory of 
these findings will be discussed briefly. Second, the apparent common interests 
will be briefly summarised. Third, the contentious issues and the interests 
involved will be theoretically discussed at more length since the dynamics of 
interests are more complex in cases of disagreements than cases of agreements. 
Fourth, the interplay between the spheres will be briefly elaborated. Finally, a 
summary of theoretical concepts that are central to understanding the dynamics of 
interest in development cooperation between donor governments and post-conflict 
diasporas will be presented. 
Considering the arguments, the findings from the previous section can be 
summarised. Two of the arguments can be said to be partly supported, namely 
those in the economic sphere and in the cultural sphere. They were partly 
supported since the main concept of ownership in the economic sphere and 
adaptation in the cultural sphere were found to be relevant. Therefore, while the 
arguments were imperfect in predicting the implication of these issues, the 
theoretically underpinnings of these arguments were supported.  
Furthermore, two of the arguments did not gain support, namely the remaining 
two in the political and societal sphere. In the political sphere, no basis for the 
assumption that diasporas would seek political influence were found. However, it 
is important to note that there was several defensive remarks about politics. The 
importance of addressing all regions in Somalia was often put forward. Therefore, 
while there seems to be little support that the diaspora would advance the interest 
of a particular geopolitical region and seek an advantage, there were clearly 
opposition to being disadvantaged. Therefore, the argument is not refuted either. 
The fourth argument did not gain support as unity, at least in the form of 
increased coordination within the diaspora, was apparently a more acute interest 
among the diaspora than among governmental representatives which is contrary to 
the argument. This is not to suggest that governmental agencies are disinterested 
in unitary diaspora actors, the opposite point gained support. Neither is it argued 
that the lack of unitary diaspora actors will not pose a problem. It is solely 
ascertained that there was no contending interest of the character proposed in the 
argument. 
Before continuing it is worth noting that the arguments as an analytical tool 
gained some validity from the fact that the arguments displaying certain 
expectations (in the certain use of “will”) gained more support than those which 
demonstrated ambivalence (in the uncertain use of “could”). 
Considering the common interests, it is important to note that despite the 
complex and contentious issues involved, and despite the fact that the interview 
guide were constructed in order to uncover precisely contentious issues, there 
were several commonalities in attitudes and perspectives that were put forward. 
There was a consensus that cooperative measures indeed were beneficial since the 
governmental agencies and the diaspora had complementary resources. 
Furthermore, the governmental respondents stressed that the diaspora had 
knowledge and skills that would benefit Somali development and the development 
assistance to Somalia. Furthermore, interest in working with different areas was 
raised by several respondents from both the government and the diaspora. The 
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main issue areas were business and gender, both of which were frequently 
mentioned. Finally, there seemed indeed to be mutual interest in continued 
inclusion even if the envisioned direction of this inclusion were not necessarily 
shared. 
It can be noted that the common interests are mainly visible in the economic 
sphere. Complementary resources or comparative advantages are mainly an 
economic consideration. The importance placed on business furthermore 
highlights the mutual interests in this sphere. The themes continued inclusion and 
knowledge and expertise in the diaspora could partly be considered economic but 
also partly cultural since inclusion is connected to organisational culture and 
knowledge is connected to cultural skills and experience. The issue of gender is 
furthermore related to all spheres. Taken together, it is observable that many 
common interests are situated in the economic sphere.   
5.2.1 Considering the contentious issues  
There are two noticeable overlaps between the different spheres in the first 
part of this chapter. First, the problematic issues of representation, dealing with 
friction and the problem of identifying the “diaspora”, were brought up both in the 
political and the societal sphere. Second, there were several contentious issues 
that were found both in the economic and cultural sphere, namely issues of 
inclusion and priorities. In the cultural sphere these issues were furthermore 
linked to the issue of knowledge or expertise. The consequent analysis will be 
structured according to these two themes or clusters of themes. 
First, there are the themes of representativeness and distribution that was 
present particularly among the diaspora in both the political and societal sphere. 
The emphasis placed by the diaspora on having a comprehensive approach to 
Somalia that does not disservice certain regions accentuates an interest in the 
development of all regions in Somalia. As mentioned previously, the interest did 
not seem to be to acquire advantage for certain regions but rather to avoid 
disadvantage for certain or all regions. Meanwhile, some respondents argued that 
the government should not create friction within the diaspora by identifying 
partners that represent regions since this approach exacerbated division within the 
diaspora. Collectively, the interest is therefore to have development initiatives that 
are (1) distributed across all regions and (2) not based on regional representation, 
at least not in the sense government-identified representatives. This is naturally a 
difficult balancing act. The first point is related to the interest in the political 
sphere to avoid disadvantages of geopolitical regions. This interest is theoretically 
linked to the aim of the diaspora to maintain their relations with the homeland 
while to some degree integrating in the receiving state. The second point is related 
to the interest in the societal sphere to avoid friction within the diaspora and the 
Somali community. This is theoretically linked with the aim to foster a common 
identity and close relationships within the diaspora.  
Furthermore, the two-folded criteria should not be seen as a trade-of, since 
inattention to one of the interests while satisfying the other should impact the 
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satisfied interest negatively. If comprehensive distribution is pursued by 
identifying representatives then the political interest of avoiding disadvantaged 
regions is satisfied at the expense of the societal interest of avoiding division. 
However, increased division should increase the perceived need to advocate the 
needs of particular regions since the regions form the representative basis for 
development initiatives, thus exacerbating the fear of misdistribution across all 
regions. 
None of the governmental respondents indicated an interest contrary to either 
of the statements above. However, one respondent said that the government 
usually preferred one partner but other methods were demanded when cooperating 
with the diaspora, indicating that a single representative diaspora actor would 
have some attraction. Furthermore, one respondent stated that government 
agencies can start by asking the a problematic question, namely “who is the 
diaspora?”. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the government could be interested in 
constructing a partner of some kind that represents the diaspora. As mentioned 
previously (3.2.4) governments to some degree do construct unitary diasporas in 
policy documents. However, government led forms of representation will lead to a 
contention of interest because of the interest among the diaspora of avoiding 
division and particularly externally enforced division. 
Therefore, there could indeed be a common interest of increased unity or 
forms of representation in the diaspora since the diaspora also found the lacking 
coordination within the diaspora to be problematic. The representative forms 
cannot however be externally imposed but should be internally constructed. But as 
both governmental and diaspora respondents argued it has been difficult for the 
Somali diaspora to find forms of representation themselves this option seem 
unpractical. 
Meanwhile, many governmental respondents shared an interest in working 
with partners based solely on capacity and goal-orientation. This approach seem 
unproblematic in terms of interest as long as comprehensive distribution is 
achieved without the identification of representative actors. If a model is found 
where distribution across all regions is achieved by identifying partners only 
based on capacity then no contentious interests should be present in the 
identification of partners. It allows for the diaspora both to maintain relations with 
the homeland and avoiding external intervention in the common identity and unity 
of the diaspora.  
However, as was posited during the interviews, cooperation based on capacity 
and goal-orientation is in itself dependent on experience and evaluation. 
Therefore, it could be expected that long-term processes and continued work with 
inclusion, aside from being a common interest in itself, would help to satisfy other 
common interests, in increasing the potential for capacity based cooperation with 
comprehensive distribution.  
Second, there are the themes of inclusion, priorities and expertise which will 
be discussed continuously. The first theme, priorities of Swedish development 
assistance were the topic for much concern among the diaspora. This partly 
related to the general priorities as well as to the priorities in diaspora engagement 
initiatives, such as the scepticism towards current internship programs. The 
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interests here are partly located in the economic sphere in the emphasis on 
efficient resource distribution
10
 as well as in the cultural sphere in the resistance 
of the diaspora to adopting Swedish development priorities.  
A contention of interests could therefore present itself because of divergent 
interest in different areas of development. First, there are areas where there is 
some visible common interest, such as gender and business-promotion. Second, 
there are areas where there is visible interest or disinterest among either 
government or diaspora and no visible interest or disinterest among the other part, 
such as increased funds to agriculture
11
 and resistance to the extensive reliance on 
multilateral channels, both of which were points raised by the diaspora. Third, 
there are areas where there are contending interests, such as the use of internships 
were a governmental respondent was positive but some diaspora respondents were 
critical of the lacking compensation.  
However, the priorities themselves were not the only contentious issue, but 
also the procedure by which they came into effect. Here, concerns about the 
second theme of inclusion of the diaspora were raised by respondents from the 
diaspora. Several respondents argued that the diaspora should be included earlier 
in the process. Such earlier inclusion would allow the diaspora to not just 
formulate the project, but also to formulate the criteria by which projects would be 
judged. It was also argued that consultation was not sufficient but practical results 
were needed. Several governmental respondents shared the view that continued 
inclusion of the diaspora was desired. The difference is therefore not so much the 
interest in inclusion, which is a common denominator, but rather how to include 
the diaspora. There is a likely discrepancy in perspective between government and 
diaspora regarding this question. For instance, even though no governmental 
respondent argued regarding the topic of multilateral channels, it is unlikely that 
the government would include the diaspora in its allocation of multilateral aid, at 
least to an extent that would be satisfactory to the diaspora. 
The last point highlights the third theme, namely that of knowledge, expertise 
and the perceived lack thereof. Respondents from the diaspora were unimpressed 
by the knowledge of Somalia in the government. Several remarks furthermore 
stressed that knowledge of the context in Somalia is important and missing. 
Indeed, respondents argued that the lack of knowledge in the government led to 
wrong priorities and accentuated the need for increase inclusion of the diaspora. 
Still, the benefits on drawing on the knowledge of the diaspora was indeed voiced 
by the governmental respondents and sometimes connected to the need for 
continued inclusion. However, there is likely to persist a perceived contradiction 
among the diaspora between the knowledge they possess and the limits of their 
influence.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10
 Distribution across different sectors, policy areas, different actors etc. as opposed to regional distribution 
which was discussed regarding the political sphere. 
11
 Agriculture was also brought up by one of the governmental respondents but as a business sector that could be 
of interest to Swedish companies (Respondent 9, 2014) rather than a prioritised area in aid allocation. 
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Consequently there are many overlaps between the cultural and economic 
sphere. As mentioned the contenting interests regarding priorities are both situated 
in the economic and cultural sphere. The contending interests regarding inclusion 
are also situated in the economic sphere, since more inclusion would also allow 
for increased resource access, and in the cultural sphere, since it related to the 
issue of adaptation to priorities that depart from a different cultural understanding. 
The issue of cultural understanding is furthermore closely related to the interests 
regarding knowledge which are mainly situated in the cultural sphere in the 
emphasis on contextual knowledge and expertise. Finding common interest 
regarding different priorities would not be sufficient to completely align the 
interests since there is a cultural and economic interest among the diaspora in 
further inclusion and increased exertion of the diasporas’ special knowledge.  
Before proceeding, a remark about the interplay between the spheres is 
needed. The division that emerged in this section into interplay between, on the 
one hand, the political and societal sphere, and on the other, the economic and 
cultural sphere, is not definite. One interaction in particular is important to note 
and that is the interplay between the societal and economic sphere. In the societal 
sphere a common theme was the lack of coordination within the diaspora which 
led to small projects. Indeed, a more collective effort would increase the ability of 
the diaspora to secure more resources and lessen the completion for smaller 
project funds thus furthering the interest in the economic sphere. The interests in 
these spheres are therefore mutually reinforcing to some extent. However, it is 
unclear whether increased availability of funds would strengthen or lessen this 
reinforcement, since increased availability of funds for a single organisation or 
association could decrease the perceived need for coordination. 
5.2.2 Central concepts 
Lastly, concepts that emerged as being central to understanding the dynamics of 
interest will be presented. These will be formulated in general theoretic terms and 
will depart from the discussion in the previous section. 
First, mainly departing from the political sphere, there will likely be an 
interest in distribution among the diaspora and whether or not it is comprehensive. 
Distribution in this sense entails distribution across different regions or other 
political cleavages in the homeland. Furthermore, the concept should be 
understood against the, potentially conflicting relationship, between the 
simultaneous need for political activism on behalf of the homeland and the need 
for a degree of integration in the receiving state. While diasporas may be inclined 
to advocate an advantageous position for a political unit in the homeland, this may 
prove difficult in the receiving state. Therefore, a more defensive approach of 
opposition to a disadvantageous position becomes the main interest. For the same 
reason, comprehensive, rather than universal distribution will be advocated, since 
some political units in post-conflict or conflict societies are likely to be off-limits, 
such as groups with noticeable involvement in violent conflict. In cases of more 
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powerful diasporas with more radical motives, it is possible that favourable 
distribution for certain political units could be advocated.  
Second, mainly situated in the societal sphere, the construction of the 
“diaspora” will be important, and in particular, whether the diaspora is internally 
or externally constructed or defined. Attempts by external actors, such as 
government agencies, to find representation or to externally construct the 
“diaspora” using other parameters will be contentious since it infringes on the 
common and special identity of the diaspora and their decision to maintain and 
define it. Therefore, internal construction of and by the diaspora will likely have 
more potential in fostering common ground. Consequently, lacking a internally 
constructed unitary “diaspora”, identification of partners need to be based on 
criteria that are non-interventionist in diaspora identity, such as capacity. 
Third, complementary resources are naturally important since it indeed proved 
to be one of the essentials in cooperation. When there is a conception that the 
different actors have different knowledge, skills and resources that can 
complement one another, continued cooperation can be seen as beneficial despite 
challenges. Therefore, the conception of the other actor as a resource is 
fundamental to the understanding of the dynamics of interests. What resources are 
seen as complementary will furthermore determine what projects that will be of 
common interest. This aspect is mainly located in the economic sphere. 
Fourth, also mainly departing from the economic sphere, is the concept 
inclusion in process and outcome, which entails both inclusion of the diaspora in 
the sense of ownership of the outcome or final project plan and execution, and 
inclusion in the process of determining the allocation of resources to different 
project-areas. The inclusion in the process of determining does not necessarily 
include actual decisions but rather the possibility to provide input in the process 
that is then visible in substance. To what degree there can be mutual satisfaction 
among government agencies and the diaspora regarding the degree of inclusion is 
difficult to appreciate, even in an in-depth case study such as this paper. The 
important point is that interests must be understood not just in relation to either 
preparatory consultation or final projects but rather in relation to both and the link 
between two. Inclusion is central for the diaspora to act as a link between the 
homeland and the receiving state. 
Finally, departing mainly from the cultural sphere, the narrative about the 
home country is important since different narratives are likely to be found 
between government agencies and the diaspora. The different narratives also 
establish the degree to which the diaspora must adapt to different priorities. The 
diaspora will likely have a different understanding of Somalia, to a large degree 
dependent on contextual cultural understandings. Therefore, diasporas can 
experience the knowledge of governmental agencies to be limited since they do 
not share the contextual and cultural awareness of diasporas. Furthermore, the 
divergence in narrative is likely to affect the perceived need for inclusion thus 
affecting the previous point. It would however also make such inclusion more 
difficult. It is highly unlikely that a divergence in narrative between governments 
and diasporas will not always be present. Therefore, the main questions should be 
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how and to what degree they diverge. The narratives will also to a large extent 
determine what areas that are of common interest.  
These five concepts constitute and influence the dynamics of interest present 
in development cooperation. Contentious and common interests are likely to be 
traceable to divergent perspectives regarding one or more of these concepts 
among the diaspora and government actors. All concepts may not, or are even 
likely to be salient at all levels in all development cooperation. Still, all concepts 
have the capability to frame the dynamics of interest. 
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6 Conclusion 
To return to the research question in this thesis, how can the dynamics of interests 
in development cooperation among Swedish governmental agencies and the 
Somali diaspora in Sweden be understood?  
To reiterate, it has been argued here that the dynamics of interest cannot solely 
be understood as a singular matter of misconceived politics, organisational 
resistance to adaptation or as an unstable and unpredictable product of homeland 
conflict. Rather, it has been posited that the dynamics of interest have to be 
understood in relation to the complex set of interests of the diaspora, which are 
active in the political, economic, cultural and societal sphere. These interests are 
in essence not reducible to interests in the home country but are a product of the 
diasporas’ dual relationship with the home and host country. The attempt to be “at 
home abroad” then frames the interest in development cooperation through 
ambiguity and the special identity that emerge from this situation. 
In the Swedish development cooperation, several common as well as 
contentious interests is present. The common interests revolved around the 
general theme of complementary resources and different issue areas, such as the 
importance of gender and business in development. Therefore, the common 
interests are mostly situated in the economic sphere. The contentious interests 
were mostly expressed among the diaspora and were situated across all four 
spheres. In the political and societal sphere there is an interest in both distribution 
across all regions in Somalia and an interest in avoiding representation based on 
regional affiliation, as long as representation is externally imposed. Moreover, in 
the economic and cultural sphere there was a perception that the diaspora should 
be more properly included. Thereby, their knowledge would not be 
unappropriated and the Swedish development priorities would not be flawed as 
was both perceived to be the case now. All of the aforementioned interests are 
influenced by the need of, and motivation for, a common, self-defined identity 
that maintains relationships with both home and host country and acts as a link 
between the two.  
Still, despite the contentious interest there seems to be some commonalities as 
well. For instance, many governmental respondents preferred to work with 
partners based on capacity. Identifying partners based on capacity could indeed 
alleviate the contention regarding the issue of representation based on regional 
affiliation. However, this might influence the interest in comprehensive 
distribution negatively. Regarding other factors, such as dissatisfaction about the 
degree of inclusion among the diaspora, a common satisfaction might be 
unattainable. 
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The dynamics of interests can be conceptualised in five concepts that 
constitute and influence the diasporas interests and the relationship with the 
government agencies (see table below).  
 
Table 3 – Conceptual framework for understanding dynamics of interest 
1. Distribution (Degree of comprehensiveness): Diasporas are likely to 
display interest in comprehensive distribution in the homeland since the 
main interest is to avoid disadvantage for the political unit with which they 
identify.  
2. Construction of the diaspora (internal or external): The diaspora are 
interested in constructing the “diaspora” themselves, that is internally and 
are likely to oppose any external attempts at constructing a diaspora.  
3. Complementary resources: The degree to which the government and the 
diaspora perceive there to be complementary resources will affect the 
overall interest, in particular of the government, for development 
cooperation.  
4. Inclusion in process and outcome: The diaspora will have an interest to 
both be involved in the process by which priorities are set and the 
execution of these priorities through projects and programmes. The 
inclusion is aimed at securing ownership and inclusion in both process and 
outcome is perceived as necessary.  
5. Narrative about the home country: The degree to which the diaspora and 
the governmental agencies differ the in their narrative about the sending 
state, which they inherently will, will both affect to amount of areas in 
which there are common interests as well as the perceived need for 
inclusion.     
 
The conceptual framework above should yield important insights and provide the 
basis for rewarding analysis on development cooperation. A more in-depth 
understanding of the dynamics of interest in development cooperation, and the 
potential problems and complexities that can arise from them, should be beneficial 
both in academia and in the policy realm. Indeed, for the governments’ ambition 
to engage the diaspora residing in Sweden, and for the diasporas’ interest in 
affecting the development in the homeland, it is important to understand their 
interaction in the continued work with development at home.  
6.1 Further research 
In order to suggest further research, it is helpful to return to the limitations 
identified in the introduction. It it should be stated that the conceptual framework 
were developed as a middle-range theory for engagement of conflict-generated 
diasporas. Therefore, it can be applicable whenever an understanding of the 
dynamics of interests in development cooperation with conflict-generated 
diasporas is wanted. Specifically, it could be interesting and beneficial to 
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incorporate the framework in a causal study on, for example, how the cooperation 
is affected by different interests. Second, the conceptual framework could be 
tested or developed in relation to other actors, such as international and 
transnational actors and, perhaps even more importantly, the home country.  
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Interview guide 
Interview guide (translated from Swedish to English) 
 
1. As we are about to talk about cooperation/coordination between the Somali 
diaspora in Sweden and Swedish governmental agencies, I am initially 
wondering if you briefly could describe what such collaborations you have 
experience of?  
— How did you get involved in that collaboration? 
— [If not mentioned during the briefing], Have any project or work been 
related to aid or other efforts directed at Somalia?  
 
2. During your time at the agency/organisation/in the diaspora network…, what 
have emerged as the biggest advantages with this form of cooperation? 
— Do the diaspora and the agencies have different ways of working, 
competences and resources that complements each other? 
— Can one expect uneven benefits in cooperation within different areas? 
Such as economic issues, cultural issues, political issues, social issues?  
 
3. [Transition based on previous answer] Are there also problems or hindrances 
that can emerge in this type of collaboration? 
— [If not mentioned at this point], Are there any problems regarding the 
division of responsibility between agencies and the diaspora in these 
collaborations? (clarification if needed: That is, how decisions are made or 
who hands out the tasks)  
 
4. [Transition based on previous discussion], What (do you believe) is important 
to consider when agencies evaluates one or more persons or organisations 
from the diaspora as partners in the (development)work?  
 
5. If we (finally) should look ahead, what could change in order for 
collaborations between the diaspora and agencies to work (even) better in the 
future? 
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Intervjuguide (original in Swedish) 
 
1. Då vi ska prata om samarbete/samverkan mellan den somaliska diasporan i 
Sverige och svenska myndigheter undrar jag först om du kort kan berätta vilka 
sådana samarbeten du har erfarenhet av? 
— Hur blev du involverad i det samarbetet? 
— [Om inte omnämnt under genomgången], Har något projekt eller arbete 
varit kopplat till bistånd eller andra insatser riktade till Somalia?  
 
2. Under din tid på myndigheten/med organisation/i diasporanätverket…, vad 
har framgått/framgick som de största fördelarna med den här typen av 
samarbeten? 
— Har diasporan och myndigheterna olika arbetssätt, kompetenser och 
resurser som kan komplettera varandra? 
— Kan man förvänta sig olika fördelaktiga samarbeten inom olika områden?, 
så som ekonomiska frågor, kulturella frågor, politiska frågor, sociala 
frågor  
 
3. [Brygga baserat på föregående svar] Finns det även problem eller hinder som 
kan träda fram vid denna typ av samarbete? 
— [Om inte omnämnt vid detta skede], Finns det några problem med 
ansvarsfördelningen mellan myndigheten och diasporan i dessa 
samarbeten? (förtydligande vid behov: Alltså hur man fattar beslut eller 
vem som delat ut arbetsuppgifter) 
 
4. [Brygga baserat på tidigare diskussion], Vad (tycker du) är viktigt att tänka på 
då myndigheter och organisationer utvärderar en eller några person(er) eller 
organisation(er) från diasporan som partner i (utvecklings)arbetet?  
 
5. Om vi (slutligen) ska blicka framåt, vad skulle kunna förändras för att 
samarbeten mellan diasporan och myndigheter ska kunna fungera (ännu) 
bättre i framtiden? 
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8.2 Respondents  
Respondent 1: Chair of a religious association and former chair of the biggest 
Somali national association in Sweden with experience of 
cooperation with agencies on both local issues and development 
directed at Somalia. 
Respondent 2: Individual from the Somali diaspora currently working with a civil 
society women’s organisation with experience of development 
projects in Somalia financed by Swedish development funds. 
Respondent 3: Individual from the Somali diaspora engaged in the national 
Somaliland association and in a clan-transcendent civil society 
organisation with experience of development cooperation with 
government agencies.  
Respondent 4: Individual from the Somali diaspora engaged in the national 
Somali women’s organisation with experience of development 
cooperation with government agencies. 
Respondent 5: Individual from the Somali diaspora running a company with the 
ambition of contributing to development with experience of 
cooperation with government agencies from organising a 
conference linking business to development in Somalia. 
Respondent 6: Civil servant at the Utrikesdepartementet (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs) with experience of working group cooperation with the 
Somali diaspora. 
Respondent 7: Civil servant at Stockholm stad (Stockholm municipality) with 
experience of working with the diaspora on the issue of re-
migration. 
Respondent 8: Civil servant at Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of 
Sweden) with working experience from the secretariat for the 
Swedish Chairmanship of the Global Forum for Migration and 
Development. 
Respondent 9: Former civil servant at Migrationsverket (The migration board, 
Swedish migration agency) with considerable experience of 
diaspora engagement in homeland development in Somalia. 
Respondent 10: Desk officer at Forum Syd, a Swedish development organisation 
with long experience of partnerships with the Somali diaspora. 
 
 
 
